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Abstract
Distance-bounding protocols allow a verifier to both authenticate a prover and evaluate whether the
latter is located in his vicinity. These protocols are of particular interest in contactless systems, e.g.,
electronic payment or access control systems, which are vulnerable to distance-based frauds. This survey
analyzes and compares in a unified manner many existing distance-bounding protocols with respect to
several key security and complexity features.
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1 Introduction and State-of-the-Art
1.1 From Relay Attacks to Evolved Distance-based Frauds
The basic concept of a relay attack was first described by Conway [25] in 1976, in a scenario referred to
as the Chess Grandmaster Problem. In this scenario, any player could play against two Grandmasters by
challenging both of them to a game of chess by post. The player would then simply forward the move received
from one Grandmaster to the other, effectively making them playing against each other. This results in the
player either winning one match, or earning a draw in both matches. Desmedt, Goutier, and Bengio [28]
extended this concept to security protocols in 1987, with an attack on the Fiat-Shamir protocol [32, 31]
they named mafia fraud. In general, a protocol is seen to be executed between a party making a claim,
the prover, and a party verifying this claim, the verifier. Mafia fraud involves a malicious third party who
aims to convince the verifier that he is the legitimate prover. To start, the third-party simply takes all the
messages sent by the verifier and forwards these to the prover. As the messages are legitimate, the prover
believes he is communicating with the legitimate verifier. The prover then generates a valid response which
the third party forwards to the verifier. Upon receiving this response, the verifier is convinced that he is
communicating with the legitimate prover and the attack succeeds. A variant of mafia fraud, denoted by
terrorist fraud, is an attack in which the prover colludes with the adversary to deceive the verifier, and was
subsequently proposed by Bengio et al. [10]. In practice, this involves a prover sharing protocol information,
other than key material, with a third-party in such a way that he allows this third-party to convince the
verifier that he is the legitimate prover without having to relay all the verifier’s messages.
Even though mafia fraud could be classified as a special type of man-in-the-middle attack, there are fun-
damental differences between these attacks. In man-in-the-middle attacks, the third party actively modifies
messages between the verifier and the prover, and in general the attack is made possible through a security
vulnerability in the protocol. In other words, man-in-the-middle attacks can be mitigated with conventional
security mechanisms. In mafia fraud, the third party is passive and simply relays messages. He does not
need to perform any further logical attack on the messages or the protocol sequence and in fact the third
party does not even need to know what he is relaying. The protocol and security mechanisms are irrelevant
as the attacker just relays the entire message generated by the legitimate parties, regardless of their content,
thereby ensuring that both the verifier and the prover always receive a valid message. Conventional security
mechanisms are therefore not an effective countermeasure.
Brands and Chaum early proposed the idea of using so-called distance-bounding protocols [17] to mitigate
mafia fraud. In addition to mafia fraud, Brands and Chaum also considered the possibility of distance fraud.
Distance fraud involves a fraudulent prover that wants to convince the verifier that he is closer than he really
is. Most recently, a new fraud termed distance hijacking was proposed [26]. In this case, a fraudulent prover
takes advantage of a protocol executed between an honest prover and the verifier. The fraudulent prover
selectively uses parts of this protocol instance to convince the verifier that he is at a distance, at which some
other honest prover resides, which differs from the actual distance of the dishonest prover to the verifier.
1.2 Practical Attacks
The frauds discussed above are of practical significance when considering real-world system security. For
example, mafia fraud is especially relevant in access control and payment systems. An RFID door access
reader might authenticate an access token by transmitting a challenge, e.g., a nonce, and then checking
whether the cryptographic response, constructed with the token’s key, is valid. In such a case, an attacker
can present a proxy-token, a device under the attacker’s control that emulates a token, to the door reader.
At the same time his accomplice has a proxy-reader, a reader under the attacker’s control, which is used to
communicate with a legitimate token. This can be done in a covert manner, e.g., holding the reader against
the token holder’s pocket while he is outside the premises. The attacker’s proxy-token gets the challenge
from the door reader and transmits it to the accomplice’s proxy-reader. The latter sends the challenge to the
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legitimate token. The proxy-reader thus obtains the valid response, which is transmitted to the proxy-token
and then sent to the door reader. The door reader is now convinced that the token it is communicating with
is the legitimate token and opens the door. A practical mafia fraud of this nature was first demonstrated
by Hancke [40], using a built-for-purpose proxy-token and relaying radio channel with an effective range
of 50 meters, alongside a modified off-the-shelf reader for the purpose of proxy-reader. Francillon, Danev,
and Cˇapkun have also practically demonstrated the feasibility of mafia fraud against remote keyless entry
systems in vehicles [35].
Similarly, payment systems are also vulnerable to mafia fraud. An attacker could convince a customer to
insert his payment card into a proxy-reader, perhaps to pay for a low-value item sold to the customer by the
attacker. The attacker’s accomplice, in the meantime, purchases a high-value item and inserts his proxy-card
into the merchant’s reader. The high-value transaction is then conducted, via the proxy devices, with the
legitimate payment card. The proxy-reader only displays the low value amount for customer approval, who
thinks that he is authorizing the transaction by entering his PIN on the proxy-reader. This PIN is transmitted
to the accomplice and it is entered into the merchant’s reader, which then verifies the PIN through the relay
setup with the legitimate card. As a causality the customer ends up paying for the attacker’s item. This
attack scenario was implemented against the “Chip and Pin” card payment system in the United Kingdom
by Drimer and Murdoch [29], and illustrates that mafia fraud can be a serious threat even when systems use
strong cryptography and two-factor authentication. The implementation of near-field communication (NFC)
in mobile phones has potentially decreased the complexity of implementing mafia fraud. An NFC-enabled
mobile phone can act as a token and a reader, so it can either act as a proxy-token or proxy-reader, while
offering multiple options with regards to communication channels for relaying messages. The potential use
of NFC devices in mafia fraud is documented by Kfir and Wool [47], and a practical mafia fraud using
NFC-enabled mobile phones has already been demonstrated by Francis et al. [37]. Some additional attack
scenarios and a discussion on the practical implementation of mafia fraud can be found in [44, 36].
Real-time location systems (RTLS) are increasingly used to track high-value assets and people. A RTLS
relies on the fact that the physical relation between reference nodes, with fixed and known locations, and
the target can be estimated. If these estimates are somehow modified by an attacker then the overall
localization process will be adversely affected and the location of the target could be misrepresented. Cˇapkun
and Hubaux [21] have shown that in the case of trilateration, and the principle extends to multilateration,
a target located outside a triangle of reference nodes cannot prove that it is inside the triangle without
shortening the distance measured to at least one of the reference nodes. Similarly, a node located inside the
triangle cannot prove it is at a different location without decreasing the measured distance to at least one of
the nodes. This means that a fraudulent prover, wishing to misrepresent his own location, must perpetrate
distance fraud against at least one reference node. In practice, distance fraud is relatively simple in certain
RTLS systems. For example, if the distances are estimated using received signal strength, then an attacker
could selectively attenuate or amplify his communication with a specific reference node. Some practical
distance fraud strategies enabling a fraudulent prover to decrease the round-trip-time of his responses are
discussed in [43] and [24].
Finally, relay attacks are particularly relevant in the field of digital rights management (DRM), although
this issue is rarely discussed in the literature. For example, a provider may refuse to deliver a content to the
customer if the latter is not in a clearly defined location, as stated for example in [58, 1, 19].
1.3 Countermeasures to Relay Attacks
To counteract relay attacks, we need to look beyond the data exchanged and incorporate the physical
context of the interaction between verifier and prover into the protocol. Desmedt was the first to introduce
solutions of this type [27]; he proposed to sign the prover GPS coordinates. In a second proposal [11], the
notion of timed message exchanges was introduced. Using precise timing, Beth and Desmedt managed to
detect the little girl fraud via the delay introduced by the relay. Desmedt, alone in a first time, then later
along with Beth, was the first to remark that countering mafia fraud implies relying on physical properties
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(localization, or timing) rather than only depending on the cryptographic parts. This observation yields to
several propositions to measure this physical property. Among them, distance-bounding protocols were the
most promising counter-measure. Distance-bounding protocols can be built on the Received Signal Strength
(RSS) [8], by measuring the Angle-of-Arrival (AoA) [38], the noise level [23], the physical property of the
communication channel [67], the ambient environment [39, 72], or the measure of the Time Of the Flight
(ToF).
The RSS, and the AoA methods are usually discarded due to implicit security flaws. Indeed, an ad-
versary can by increasing its signal strength or building special antenna deceive these measurements [22].
Methods based on the noise level or on channel properties work in theory. However, they are not practical
to implement.
ToF methods are more reliable, and often used to evaluate the distance d between two parties by cal-
culating d = spr · tp where spr is the propagation speed of signals on the medium of the communication
channel and tp is the one-way propagation time between the transmitter and the receiver [42]. An attacker
committing mafia fraud will unavoidably increase the time that the message takes to travel between the
prover and verifier. Even simply forwarding and transmitting messages increases the ToF. Measuring this
time and checking for unexpected delay in a response is therefore recognized as a feasible method for de-
tecting mafia fraud [11]. ToF distance estimation comprises both Time-of-arrival (ToA) or round-trip-time
(RTT) approaches. ToA requires both a verifier and prover to share a synchronized, high-precision clock
and only the propagation time of a single message is measured. For example, the verifier sends a challenge
chall to the prover, and records the time t0 it was sent. The prover records the time t0 + tp the challenge was
received and responds with the authenticated message {t0 + tp, chall}. If both the prover and the verifier
are trusted, this protocol is effective in detecting mafia frauds. However, it is vulnerable to distance fraud
as the prover can simply decrease the value of t0 + tp in the response to appear closer. From a practical
perspective, both the prover and the verifier might not have a synchronized precise clock, e.g., an RFID
reader could have such a precise clock but an RFID tag not.
1.4 Distance-Bounding Based on RTT
Both these issues can be addressed using an RTT distance-estimation approach. In RTT, the verifier measures
the time tm from the moment he has sent a challenge to the moment the response is received. The verifier
is therefore completely in control of the measurement and he is also the only entity that requires a precise
clock. In this case the verifier can estimate the distance d = c · (tm− td)/2, where tm is the round-trip-time,
equal to 2 · tp + td, and td is the time the prover takes to calculate the response. For example, the verifier
sends a challenge chall at t0, which the prover receives at t0 + tp. The prover sends a response back at
t0 + tp + td and this is received at tv = t0 + 2 · tp + td, allowing for the RTT to be calculated as tm = tv − t0.
The fraudulent prover can no longer directly influence the measurement, as is the case with ToA, but he
could try to send his response earlier than he receives the challenge. To prevent this, a protocol must be
designed in such a way that the response depends on the challenge, i.e., r = f(chall), so that the prover
has to wait for the challenge before responding. This response function f also determines the length of the
processing time td, which must be minimal and deterministic, to achieve an accurate estimate. The response
function must therefore be of minimal complexity and should be processable in a short and predictable time.
Distance-bounding protocols are closely linked to aspects of the physical communication channel, a side
effect of requiring accurate timing measurements. The channel on which the challenges and responses are to
be transmitted must therefore be chosen in such a way that it does not adversely affects the security of the
protocol or the accuracy of the distance estimated. Conventional communication channels have been shown
to be unsuitable for secure distance-bounding protocols, due to the possibility that an attacker could exploit
the latency introduced in these channels by error-resistant measures, such as framing/integrity data and
filters in transceivers [24, 43]. In practice, building a distance-bounding channel is a hard problem. Even
if we only consider the distance estimation requirements, a timing measurement error of 1 ns could result
in a distance estimation error of approximately 30 cm, and measuring the RTT to this level of accuracy is
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not feasible in systems often suggested to benefit from distance-bounding. Implementing suitable channels
is still an open research question, although there are several proposals already described and practically
demonstrated in the literature [64, 63, 61, 41, 29].
In 2006, Clulow et al. [24] proposed four principles for implementing a secure channel for timed challenge-
response exchanges:
1. Use a communication medium with a propagation speed as close as possible to the physical limit, i.e.,
speed of light.
2. Use a communication format in which only a single symbol is transmitted as challenge of response.
3. Minimize the length of this symbol, or the time taken to decide the value of the symbol.
4. Design the protocol such that it copes with errors during the challenge-response exchange.
These principles have historical significance, as this work was the first to look at the security implications
of the underlying implementation of the exchange channel. However, there is a growing opinion that these
principles, aiming for theoretical security, are not fully achievable in practice. As such it is perhaps better
to consider the intentions behind the principles’ definition, which helps us understand potential security
threats and evaluate the effectiveness of a channel used for distance-bounding, rather than considering these
as hard conditions for secure distance-bounding. The first principle advises against the use of channels
with a relatively low propagation speed as this would allow an attacker to use a faster channel to relay the
communication and not be detected. For example, if distance-bounding is conducted across a sound channel
the attacker can execute an undetectable relay attack using wired or radio communication. The second
principle advises against sending multiple challenges and responses during a single timed exchange, and
against the transmission of any additional information even for purposes of error detection or formatting,
e.g., any parity bits, cyclic redundancy checks (CRC), headers/trailers or start/stop bits. In both cases it
is shown that a dishonest prover could exploit such exchanges to correctly send a reply earlier than what
is expected from a honest prover adhering to the channel rules. The nature of the attack depends on the
format of the message but the general idea is that the dishonest prover can calculate and prepare the response
before the entire challenge message is received, thus shortening the response time compared to a honest prover
waiting for the entire message. The third principle advises that the decision should be made as quickly as
possible. If the symbol modulation/encoding is such that the entire symbol must be received the symbol
period must be minimized or the receiver should determine the value early on in the symbol period. This is
meant to protect against early detect/late send relay attacks, where the attacker can take advantage of the
duration between the start of the symbol and when the receiver actually determines its value. For example,
when using non-return to zero (NRZ) coding the receiver usually samples the symbol after ts/2, where ts is
the symbol period, which allows for the maximum tolerance to data clock differences between the sender and
receiver. If the attacker can sample the symbol at ts/10, he has 4 · ts/10 to relay its value and transmit it to
the receiver. In such a case, there will be no detectable delay in the communication and distance-bounding
would be ineffective. To minimize the amount of time available to the attacker, the receiver must make
its decision as early as possible during the symbol period. The fourth principle, taking into account that
principles two and three would not allow for conventional error detection/correction measures and reduces the
receiver’s tolerances for reliably decoding of data, advises that the protocol cannot expect that the exchange
channel will have no communication errors and that this has to be taken into consideration elsewhere in the
system.
1.5 Protocol Evolution
Distance-bounding protocols are based on the Round-Trip-Time (RTT) of challenge-response messages, and
are essentially meant to detect any unexpected delay in the provers’ responses inherently caused by the
messages being relayed over a larger distance by a third party. To effectively achieve this goal, protocols
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must meet some simple requirements to obtain an accurate propagation time measurement, as explained in
the previous section: the response and challenge must be single bits, the response must be dependent on
the challenge and the time taken to calculate the response must be minimal and predictable. There are a
number of protocols that aim to implement distance-bounding but do not adhere to these requirements, e.g.,
[11, 75, 58]. However, they are not capable of providing accurate distance estimates because of the variation
in the time taken to calculate the response, which makes them unsuitable for many use cases. For example,
the time taken by a smart token to encrypt a message or perform a digital signature differs each time. If such
a token usually takes 100 ms to calculate a response and if there is even a 0.1% variation, this results in a
RTT variation of 0.1 ms and hence a 30000 km distance estimate error. This paper only considers protocols
proposals adhering to the prescribed requirements for distance-bounding.
In a distance-bounding protocol, not all exchanged messages are subject to round-trip-time measurements.
The protocol can be divided into three distinct phases: setup, exchange, and verification. During the setup
phase, the verifier and the prover exchange some initial information and determine the cryptographic material
used during the rest of the protocol. During the exchange stage, the verifier measures the round-trip-time
of the challenge-response pairs. The validity of the responses and the distance-bound is checked during the
verification stage. The setup and verification phases are commonly referred to as the “slow” phases, while
the exchange phase is referred to as the “fast” phase, due to the nature of the communication during these
phases. The slow phase uses a conventional channel while the fast phase requires a special channel.
The first distance-bounding protocol was proposed by Brands and Chaum [17]. This protocol, based on
Beth and Desmedt’s [11] idea that RTT can detect mafia fraud, bounds the distance between the parties
by measuring the RTT of single-bit challenges and responses. During the setup phase, the prover crypto-
graphically commits to a random string that he will use to calculate the responses using an XOR operation.
During the verification stage the prover signs a message containing the challenges received and the responses
sent. The protocol achieves an optimal
(
1
2
)n
resistance against both mafia fraud and distance fraud, where
n is the number of challenge-response exchanges. This concept formed the basis for numerous protocols,
whose evolution is represented in Figure 1.
There are four direct descendants of Brands and Chaum’s protocol: [59, 61, 20, 42], each of which improved
Brands and Chaum in its own way. Peris-Lopez et al. [59] propose that cryptographic puzzles should be
used to provide privacy in distance-bounding protocols. Rasmussen and Cˇapkun protocol [61] is based on
XOR and a comparison function, and has the benefit that the prover does not need to demodulate the signal
to answer to the verifier’s challenges. The MAD protocol proposed by Cˇapkun et al. [20] allows for mutual
distance-bounding. This protocol was enhanced by the protocol of Singele´e and Preneel [65], which added
bit-error resilience to MAD by using error correcting codes. The Hancke and Kuhn’s protocol [42], originally
designed to be used in the RFID environment and is thus optimized for execution time and minimal prover
complexity, uses pre-computation, instead of a commitment step, during the setup phase in such a way that
no additional messages need to be transmitted during the verification stage.
Hancke and Kuhn’s protocol has two issues: it does not take terrorist attacks into account, and it
achieves a sub-optimal performance-security trade-off with respect to mafia and distance frauds of
(
3
4
)n
.
Subsequently, numerous proposals based on the pre-computation method used by Hancke and Kuhn were
proposed in an effort to improve its performance. Bussard and Bagga’s protocol [18] and all its descendants
introduce resistance to terrorist fraud. These protocols are based on Bussard and Bagga’s idea that the
prover long-term secret is incorporated into the pre-computed response options in such a way that if the
prover reveals all the options his accomplice would also get the prover’s key. This therefore discourages the
prover to participate in a terrorist fraud, but at the cost of a complex proof-of-knowledge operation. Its
descendants aim to achieve the same functionality but with decreased computational complexity. Reid et
al. [64] so improves the computational efficiency but the fraud resistance is ( 34 )
n in comparison to Bussard
and Bagga’s
(
1
2
)n
. Tu and Piramuthu’s protocol [71] proposes a protocol compounded by a succession of
fast and slow phases. However, this protocol suffers from several vulnerabilities, discussed in [50, 56], that
reveal the secret to an eavesdropper during a legitimate protocol run. The swiss-knife protocol [50] fixes the
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Brands and Chaum
1993
Rasmussen and Capkun
2011
(No demodulation)
Hancke and Kuhn
2005
(Registers)
Walter and Felten
2003
(one pass fast phase)
SECTOR
2003
(mutual authentication)
Peris-Lopez,
Hernandez-Castro,
Palomar, Tapiador,
and Van der Lubbe
2010
(cryptographic puzzles)
Nikov and Vauclair
2008
(exchanges lightening)
MAD
2007
(noise resilience)
Kardas, Kiraz, Bin-
gol, and Demirci
2011
(PUF)
Munilla and Peinado
2006, 2008
(third state and
tag detection)
Bussard and Bagga
2005
(terrorist fraud
resistance)
Avoine and
Tchamkerten
2009
(tree)
Kim and Avoine
2009, 2011
(tag detection)
MUSE
2009
(multistate)
Reid, Neito, Tang,
and Senadji
2007
(computation
lightening)
Poulidor
2010
(graph)
Yum, Kim,
Hong, and Lee
2011
(mutual authentication)
Tu and Piramuthu
2007
(protocol structure)
Swiss-knife
2008
(third phase)
Avoine, Lau-
radoux, and Martin
2011
(secret sharing)
Hitomi
2009
(register computation)
Boureanu, Mitrokotsa,
and Vaudenay
2012
(protocol adaptiveness)
Figure 1: Distance-bounding evolution
poor mafia fraud resistance problem by adding a third phase to Reid et al.’s protocol, and it also provides
mutual authentication. In [60], the authors claim that they found an attack on this protocol based on nonce
repetitions, and thus propose the Hitomi variation. However, if the assumption is made that nonces repeat
then Hitomi suffers, to a lesser extent, of a similar flaw. A further variation of the swiss-knife protocol [5]
explicitly introduces secret-sharing to counter terrorist fraud, and studies the best settings in which to use
it. Avoine and Tchamkerten’s protocol [7] introduces binary trees to compute the prover answers during
the exchange phase, and succeeds in improving mafia fraud resilience to almost ( 12 )
n. Indeed, various graph
structures can be used instead of a tree structure. The interest of cyclic and q-partite graphs has been
demonstrated in [69] and [51, 52], respectively. Finally, Trujillo et al. [70] show that precomputation-based
protocols can also deal with noise without sacrificing security.
Munilla and Peinado [54, 55] initiated a new branch of the Hancke-Kuhn pre-computation family. Their
protocol communicates during the exchange phase using binary symbols, 0 and 1, and also an additional
“nothing” state. MUSE [3] is a generalization of this idea relaxing the number of possible states. Kim and
Avoine’s protocols [48, 49] enhance the attack detection mechanism. Its descendant [76] uses the detection
mechanism to also provide mutual authentication. Finally, Kardas¸ et al. [46] introduce PUFs in Hancke and
Kuhn’s protocol and claim the protocol now resists to terrorist fraud.
1.6 Provable Security
Most distance-bounding protocols have been analyzed without a formal approach. Instead, generic best-
known attacks are usually adapted to the specific features of the protocol at hand, which has led to unsound
analyzes and unfair comparisons. Examples are the protocols proposed in [54], [71], and [76], whose flaws
are explored in [2], [56], and [4], respectively. The first comprehensive formalization for analyzing distance-
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bounding protocols was proposed by Avoine et al. [2]; this is not a provable security formalism, but it is a
framework that can describe attack-scenarios in a unitary fashion, and thus offer a systematic manner of
computing upper-bounds on the probabilities of typical attacks in distance-bounding and its variants. This
unified framework [2] defines the following important objects: the prover model (depending on the prover
tampering-resistance, it can be either black-box or white-box ); the prover’s computing capabilities (e.g.,
whether the prover can exploit latencies between the slow and fast phases); and the attacker’s strategies
(e.g., pre-ask, post-ask, and early-reply).
Recent efforts have been made on proving security for distance-bounding [30, 14, 16, 15, 34, 73]. However,
this is still a very young field that needs to overcome three main, inter-dependent challenges: (i) the intro-
duction of sound communication, network and adversarial models that capture the notion of time-of-flight,
(ii) the definition of clear and rigorous specifications of the classical frauds (i.e., formal definitions of these
frauds that can be proven to hold or to be refuted within the model), and (iii) formal security proofs based
on cryptographic assumptions. To illustrate for instance the difficulty of the third challenge, [13] proved that
many protocols fall short in having their security based on the pseudorandom function (PRF) assumption
of some underlying primitive.
The first formalism in this direction was put forward by Du¨rholz et al. [30]. The authors formalize
the impossibility of illegitimate yet sufficiently fast round-trip communications using the notion of tainted
sessions; to encode timing-restrictions, tainted sessions only allow certain flows of communication. Then,
a protocol is said to be secure if no adversary executing it with tainted sessions can violate its security
properties. The model comprises a formalization of all the classical frauds and provides several (partial)
security proofs for some protocols [30, 33]. This formal model is a step in the right direction towards
provably secure distance-bounding.
Another line on provably secure distance-bounding, which builds on the model by Du¨rholz et al., is in [34].
One addition therein is proposing a distance-bounding protocol that uses not one but two different secret keys
for the slow and fast phases. This bypasses the aforementioned problem of using just the PRF-assumption
to argue the security of (one-key) distance-bounding.
In [14, 16], the authors provide a rather general model that captures the notion of concurrency (i.e., al-
lowing adversaries to interact with many provers and verifiers, sometimes with the same keys). Their notions
of distance and mafia frauds additionally capture the one of distance hijacking [26] and impersonation [30],
respectively. Furthermore, their definition for terrorist-fraud is more general than the notion of terrorist
fraud adopted in this manuscript: after the initial collusion, the possible threats to protect against may be
stronger in [14, 16] (e.g., MiM in concurrent settings). The authors also propose a set of distance-bounding
schemes offering provable security against all forms of attacks within their model. A simplified version of [14],
where the elements of provable security are played down to best-attack scenarios, is available in [15].
As depicted above, attention to provably secure distance-bounding is increasing. However, we underline
that there is little consensus on which formalizations are appropriate, by different metrics. This is evident
for instance in the formalization of terrorist-fraud (TF) resistance, arguably due in part to its non-falsifiable
nature which –in turn– renders it hard to (provably) attain in distance-bounding designs.
Firstly, we underline a distinction between a commonplace view on TF resistance and the formal ex-
pressions of this. There is a wide-spread acceptation in the distance-bounding literature that TF resistance
ought to repose on the reduction to the impossibility to protect against the “trivial vulnerability” whereby
a prover gives away his secret-key to the adversary. That is, a protocol is often popularly understood to be
TF resistant if the dishonest prover who helps the adversary authenticate fraudulently in one run leaks his
secret key to the adversary. Whilst this is a valid acceptation, the formal models above generally do not
formalize precisely this commonplace view on terrorist-fraud resistance. Some approaches, e.g., [34, 12],
formalize the following statement: the protocol is resistant to TF or some generalizations thereof if whenever
the dishonest prover helps the adversary authenticate fraudulently, the adversary gains advantages in future
authentication attempts in the absence of the illicit help. Other approaches [73] encode formally that the
protocol is sound (or terrorist-fraud resistant in a generalized sense) if the following holds: for all protocol-
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runs with a verifier, there exists an extractor who reconstructs the secret when he is given the knowledge of
all participants which were close to the verifier in several successful executions.
Secondly, authors have changed and abridged their own formal definitions of these expressions of TF
resistance. Du¨rholz et al. define SimTF , StrongSimTF , and GameTF terrorist-fraud resistance [30, 34].
Boureanu et al. put forward formalizations of terrorist-fraud resistance in [15], as well as formalizations of
generalizations of TF resistance in notions of collusion-fraud resistance [14, 12]. To this end, Vaudenay took
collusion-fraud resistance further into a notion of soundness [73] akin to similar expressions in interactive
proofs.
Thirdly, one can argue that some of these formal definitions for TF resistance might yield a too strong
requirement, disproving security all-throughout (like the SimTF formulation of terrorist-fraud resistance
in [30]), or might be too general (like aforementioned collusion-fraud resistance in [14] that suits the provable
security of the SKI schemes [12]), or less realistic (like the SimTF formulation for terrorist-fraud resistance
in [30] in which the dishonest prover and the adversary are not allowed to communicate during the fast
rounds). On the one hand, when we fix the model, we can nonetheless see that some of these definitions
imply one another (StrongSimTF in [34] implies SimTF in [30], and soundness in [73] implies collusion-
fraud resistance in [12], for certain parameters). On the other hand, even in one such fixed model, other
definitions remain however incomparable (e.g., GameTF and StrongSimTF in [34]), underlying further
the unsettlement of formalizing terrorist-fraud resistance even within one and the same formalism.
Last but not least, formal comparisons between the session-based model in [30, 34] and the model inspired
by interactive proofs in [12, 73] do not exist. In the absence of a formal proof aligning the two models and
their security definitions, it appears that SimTF resistance in [30] is equivalent to the notion of terrorist-
fraud resistance in [15] and that GameTF resistance in [34] is equivalent to collusion-fraud resistance in [14]
(for some parameters).
Similar discussions apply –of course– to the formalizations of threats other than terrorist-fraud in the
aforementioned formalism. As such, formal relations between the existing formal models for distance-
bounding and their formal definitions of security is an avenue of future research.
Due to such differences between the formal models, we decided to carry out our analyses in the general
framework by Avoine et al. [2]. This framework does not repose on such fine-grained formalizations of
the distance-bounding threats1, but instead it formalizes classes of interactions between the provers and
the attackers in order to better classify attack strategies, towards an unitary approach to assessing the
security/insecurity of distance-bounding.
1.7 Contributions
This article provides an in-depth security comparison of many existing distance-bounding protocols. After
the introduction of the notation and the methodology in Section 2, the next twelve sections present several
important published distance-bounding protocols. Each section presents in a unified way the considered
protocol and its security analysis. Those who are not familiar with the presented protocols will be able to
consult Appendix A, which provides thorough descriptions of the twelve protocols. Section 15 presents the
comparison methodology and results. The article also includes Appendix B, which discusses about variants
and extensions that can be applied to most of the considered protocols.
2 Analysis Methodology and Notations
This paper analyzes twelve distance-bounding protocols using a unique methodology, based on the distance-
bounding framework published in [2]. Table 1 contains the unified notations used throughout the paper.
1For instance, the popular take on TF resistance by reduction to impossible protection against the “trivial vulnerability” is
not attainable in the “white box model for TF” from [2], whilst some of the formal expressions for TF resistance summarized
above would be.
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Each protocol description is divided into 3 steps, namely initialization, protocol, and final phase. Each
protocol is depicted in a figure that is available in the supplementary online material, along with a table
that summarizes the protocol parameters. Protocols consist of slow phases that are not time-constrained,
and fast phases where the verifier measures the round-trip times of exchanged messages. The fast phases are
identified with a left square bracket. Anything in the bracket is repeated n times, except if stated otherwise.
Each protocol description is followed by a security analysis according to the template provided in Section 2.2.
The properties and performance are analyzed according to Section 2.3 and 2.4.
2.1 Fraud definitions
A distance-bounding protocol is a process whereby a party (known as verifier) is assured (i) of the identity
of a second party (known as prover) and (ii) that the prover is located in his close vicinity (known as
neighborhood). Four frauds against distance-bounding are usually considered, impersonation, distance, mafia,
and terrorist frauds [2], which are introduced below.
Impersonation An impersonation fraud is an attack where an adversary acting alone purports to be a
legitimate prover.
Distance fraud A distance fraud is an attack where a dishonest prover purports to be in the neighborhood
of the verifier. He cheats without help of other entities located in the neighborhood.
Mafia fraud A mafia fraud is an attack where an adversary defeats a distance-bounding protocol using a
man-in-the-middle between the verifier and an honest prover located outside the neighborhood.
Terrorist fraud A terrorist fraud is an attack where an adversary defeats a distance-bounding protocol
using a man-in-the-middle between the verifier and a dishonest prover located outside of the neighborhood
under the following circumstances. The dishonest prover actively helps the adversary to maximize her current
attack success probability, but without giving her any advantage for future man-in-the-middle attacks. (In
such attacks, the man-in-the-middle (MiM) would attempt to pass the distance-bounding protocol as a valid
prover/tag which the MiM does not represent/possess.)
Note that protocols that are known to suffer from a key-recovery attack are not analyzed in this article.
This includes Tu and Piramuthu’s protocol [71] whose flaws are discussed in [50, 56], Reid et al.’s protocol [64]
broken in [5, 53], and Hitomi whose vulnerabilities are described in [66]. While [9] points out a key recovery
attack on Bussard and Bagga’s protocol [18], this protocol is kept in this analysis because the attacks
presented in [9] could be applied to other protocols and designers must be aware of their existence to avoid
them. Note also that the length of the long-term secret keys of the parties, the length of the signatures (when
appropriate), and the length of the nonces are assumed to be large enough, such that exhaustive search and
replay attack are not relevant. Finally, the pseudo random functions used in the protocols are assumed to
be without design flaws, i.e., no trapdoor pseudo random functions, like those discussed in [13].
Another type of fraud, known as distance hijacking, has recently been introduced in [26]. The fraud
considers a dishonest prover who aims to convince a verifier that he is located within the verifier’s neigh-
borhood, abusing for that some other provers who are indeed in the verifier’s neighborhood. For example,
a dishonest prover can reach his goal by hijacking the fast phase of a distance-bounding protocol executed
between an honest (closer) prover and the verifier. Conceptually, distance hijacking can be placed between
distance fraud and terrorist fraud. Unlike terrorist fraud, where a dishonest prover colludes with another
attacker, distance hijacking considers a dishonest prover who interacts with (abuses) other honest provers.
Unlike distance fraud that only involves a dishonest prover and a verifier, distance hijacking also involves
other honest provers. These seemingly subtle differences have significant consequences, e.g., the counter-
measures proposed against terrorist fraud strictly depend on the fact that the dishonest prover needs to
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Table 1: Notations
Prover and Verifier
P , IDP Prover, Prover identity
V , IDV Verifier, Verifier identity
NV , NP Nonces sent by verifier and prover, respectively.
Rounds
n Number of rounds in the fast phase
i Index of the current round
Secrets
K Long-term secret key shared by prover and verifier
Ke, Kd Public/Private keys for Encryption/Decryption
Ks, Kv Private/Public keys for Signature/Verification
Time
∆ti Round Trip Time (RTT) measured during round i
tmax Threshold on the round-trip time (typically, there is a round failure if ∆ti>tmax)
Challenges and Responses
ci Challenge sent by the verifier in round i
c′i Challenge received by the prover in round i
ri Response sent by the prover in round i
r′i Response received by the verifier in round i
Registers
R0, R1 Main registers
Z0,Z1,... Additional registers, when needed.
H Crypto function output, usually viewed as a register, e.g., H = h(NV , NP )
Sizes
σ Size of the signature, commitment, or MAC (in the slow phase)
ιP ,ιV ,ι Size of IDP and IDV . If |IDP |=|IDV | then the value is denoted ι (bits)
κ Size of K (bits)
δP , δV , δ Size of the nonces NV and NP . If |NV|= |NP| then the value is denoted δ (bits)
Errors
eX Number of errors of type X, e.g., eC , eR, eT
emax Threshold on the number of errors
Functions
dH(., .) Hamming distance
H(.) Hamming weight
SignKs (.) Signature function with private key Ks
VerifKv (.) Public-key signature verification function with public key Kv
Commit(.) Commitment function
Open(.) Open commitment function
h(.) Cryptographic hash function
hK(.) Cryptographic hash function keyed with the secret key K
MACK(.) Message authentication code keyed with the secret key K
fK(.) Pseudorandom function keyed with the secret key K
EK(.) Encryption function keyed with the secret key K
DK(.) Decryption function keyed with the secret key K
Misc
E(.) Mathematical expectation
∈R Randomly and uniformly picked in...
∈R {0, 1}x Randomly and uniformly picked in the set {0, 1}x, typically x = δ
|| Concatenation of words (possibly 1-bit words)
p Number of runs of the cryptographic function, in the analyzes
p,q Prime numbers.
pX Probability of event X
w Hamming weight, e.g., w = H(x)
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share data with another attacker. In fact, the protocols BC [17], MAD [20], and RC [61] are not resistant
against hijacking fraud according to [26]. The version of RC presented in Section 10 comes from [62]. This
is a version that has been modified to be resilient to distance hijacking. Cremers et al. provide in [26] a
clear analysis of existing protocols that resist to the hijacking fraud. Vaudenay analyzes additional protocols
in [74]. We consequently refer the reader to these articles to get more information about distance hijacking.
2.2 Security
The analyses usually performed in distance-bounding do not provide a security proof, but state the resistance
of a protocol given a clearly defined scenario, which includes the type of fraud, but also the adversary’s
capabilities and strategies, described below and summarized in Table 2.
Table 2: Attack scenarios
Fraud
Prover P’s Computing Adversary Success
Model Capability Strategy Probability
Impers. (1) (1) (4) PrImp
Mafia (1) (1)
pre-ask PrMF|pre
post-ask PrMF|post
Distance
black-box (2)
pre-ask & early-reply PrDF|BB|pre&early
post-ask & early reply PrDF|BB|post&early
white-box
single run
early-reply
PrDF|WB(1)|early
multiple run PrDF|WB(p)|early
Terrorist
black-box (2) (3) (3)
white-box
single run
early-provide
PrTF|WB(1)
multiple run PrTF|WB(p)
(1) The computing capability is not relevant with an honest prover.
(2) The computing capability is not relevant in the black box model.
(3) This case is equivalent to the mafia fraud case.
(4) No strategy is defined in [2] for impersonation.
Prover model Depending on the tamper-resistance of the prover, two models are defined: black-box and
white-box. In the black-box model, the prover can neither observe nor tamper with the execution of the
algorithm. In the white-box model, the prover has full access to the implementation of the algorithm and a
complete control over the execution environment, as detailed in [2].
Prover computing capabilities The prover computing capabilities may affect the security of the protocol
when considering distance and terrorist fraud in the white box model, given that the prover is also the attacker
in such frauds. For example, in HK protocol, the prover may exploit a latency between the slow and fast
phases to generate registers with a low Hamming distance [2].
Adversary strategies The framework [2] points out that three relevant adversary’s strategies should be
considered when analyzing a distance-bounding protocol: pre-ask, post-ask, and early-reply strategies. In
the pre-ask strategy, the adversary relays the first slow phase between the verifier and the prover, then
executes the fast phase with the prover before the verifier starts it. In the post-ask strategy, the adversary
relays the first slow phase, then executes the fast phase with the verifier without involving the prover. The
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adversary then queries the prover with the correct challenges received during the fast phase. This strategy
is meaningful when the protocol is completed with a second slow phase used to check that the challenges
received by the prover are correct. In the early-reply strategy, the adversary anticipates the replies to make
them arrive on time, which is particularly relevant with distance fraud. No strategy for the terrorist fraud
is defined in [2]. We introduce here the early-provide strategy: in this strategy, the adversary located inside
the neighborhood, first relays the slow phase to the prover. The latter then provides to the adversary some
information to help him to improve her success probability during the fast phase with the verifier. Finally,
the adversary relays the final slow phase, if any.
Remark 1 (Circle analysis) A prover located outside the neighborhood of the verifier but not too far may
receive some challenges while the protocol is still running. When the rounds of the fast phase are independent,
this late information is useless. However, the adversary may use this information to increase her success
probability when the rounds are not independent. Consequently, when analyzing the resistance of a protocol
against distance and terrorist frauds the area the prover is located should be considered. However, in all the
analyzed protocols, either this scenario is not relevant due to the round independency, or the calculation of
the success probability is still an open problem.
Remark 2 (Multiple-execution) The framework also points out that some information could leak when
the protocol is executed several times. Typically, this case occurs when the prover and the verifier generate
two registers without involving randomness from the prover. None of the protocols analyzed in the paper are
known to suffer from this weakness. Consequently, it is not explicitly addressed in the analysis.
2.3 Properties
The protocol properties considered in the paper are described below and summarized in Table 3. Note
that the type of data exchanged during the fast phase is usually binary. This is the case for all protocols
considered in this analysis, except the one discussed in Section 14.
Adaptiveness Indicates whether the protocol provides an adjustable trade-off between resistance to mafia
and distance frauds.
Mutual authentication Indicates whether the protocol provides mutual authentication. Note that, mu-
tual authentication does not imply mutual distance-bounding: while the identity proof is bilateral in that
case, the distance proof is unilateral in all the analyzed protocols.
Second slow phase Indicates whether there is a second slow phase in the protocol after the fast phase.
Independence of the rounds Indicates whether each expected response during the fast phase depends
on the current challenge only.
2.4 Performance
The protocol performance is described below and summarized in Table 4.
Cryptographic primitives Type of cryptographic primitives needed to be implemented on the prover
side: cryptographically-secure pseudo-random number generator, hash, encryption, commitment, and signa-
ture. Hash functions and ciphers are actually aggregated into a single category that is denoted symmetric
primitive.
Exchanged bits (slow phase) Number of exchanged bits during the slow phase(s).
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Exchanged bits (fast phase) Number of exchanged bits during the fast phase.
Memory consumption Amount of memory that is needed during the entire fast phase by the prover.
Table 3: Properties
Property Value
Adaptiveness Yes/No
Mutual authentication Yes/No/Optional
Second slow phase Yes/No
Round independence Yes/No
Table 4: Performance
Performance Value
Cryptographic primitives Type
Exchanged bits (slow phase) bits
Exchanged bits (fast phase) bits
Memory consumption bits
3 Brands and Chaum’s Protocol (1993)
In 1993, Brands and Chaum designed several distance-bounding protocols [17]. This analysis focuses on
their protocol (Algorithm 1 – See Appendix A) that mitigates both mafia and distance fraud.
Assuming that the signature scheme is secure, impersonating the prover can only be done by sending a
randomly selected correct signature. Such a naive attack has success probability PrImp = (1/2)
`. However,
while nonce-based replay attacks are not addressed in this paper (Section 2.1), a challenge-based replay
attack should be considered. Indeed, if the challenges sent by the verifier are used twice, then the adversary
can reuse the same mi’s and thus obtains the correct Open(Commit) and SignKs(c1||r1|| . . . ||cn||rn). After
eavesdropping one execution before the attack, the success probability becomes PrImp = (1/2)
n.
Pre-ask strategy (mafia fraud) The adversary gets the commitment and queries the prover with random
bits (ci) during the fast phase. The adversary then receives the responses (ri) and the final signature. With
this information, the adversary computes mi = ci ⊕ ri, then sends the valid responses to the verifier during
the fast phase, and finally the commitment and the signature during the second slow phase. However, the
signature received from the prover is not valid for this protocol run, except if the challenges sent by the
adversary to the prover and the challenges sent by the verifier to the adversary are the same. The success
probability of this strategy is the probability of guessing the challenges correctly: PrMF|pre =
(
1
2
)n
[2].
Post-ask strategy (mafia fraud) The adversary must predict the correct responses to be sent to the
verifier during the fast phase without any assistance. We thus have: PrMF|post =
(
1
2
)n
.
Early-reply strategy with one run (distance fraud) Given that the adversary must predict the
current challenge correctly beforehand, her success probability is provided by the formula: PrDF|WB(1)|early =(
1
2
)n
[2].
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Early-reply strategy with p runs (distance fraud) No cryptographic function is used to compute regis-
ters, contrary to Hancke and Kuhn’s approach. This fact trivially yields: PrDF|WB(p)|early = PrDF|WB(1)|early.
Pre-ask combined with early-reply strategy (distance fraud) With the pre-ask strategy, the ad-
versary learns all the possible answers. However, she does not know the challenges, so when she sends her
answers in advance, two cases occur: a) the verifier uses the same challenge as she did with the verifier.
Therefore she always succeeds, b) the verifier picks another challenge and she has sent an incorrect answer
to the verifier. Hence, the success probability of this strategy is: PrDF|BB|pre&early =
(
1
2
)n
.
Post-ask combined with early-reply strategy (distance fraud) Given that the adversary must
commit during the first slow phase, she cannot just answer randomly during the fast phase and she will
therefore need to predict the responses expected by the verifier. Hence we have: PrDF|BB|post&early =
(
1
2
)n
.
This protocol is not designed to resist to terrorist fraud in the white box model. Indeed, the prover
without revealing his secret Ks, is able to provide to his accomplice the commitment and the signature,
which are required to succeed. Consequently: PrTF|WB = 1 [50].
4 Cˇapkun, Buttya´n, and Hubaux’s Protocol (2003)
In 2003, Cˇapkun, Buttya´n, and Hubaux introduced MAD [20], a protocol that works quite similarly to the
BC protocol [17], but provides mutual authentication. Although denoted by P and V , the two parties act as
both prover and verifier during the execution of the protocol (Algorithm 2 – See Appendix A). The notations
used in [20] are kept in the description below.
The basic way to impersonate the prover is to generate the random numbers r and r′, and to complete
the first slow phase and the fast phase. The adversary must then guess the output of the MAC function in
the second slow phase. The probability of a correct guess is: PrImp =
(
1
2
)σ
.
Without loss of generality, we assume that the adversary seeks to impersonate P against V .
Pre-ask strategy (mafia fraud) To succeed in the mafia fraud, the output of the MAC function in the
second slow phase needs to be valid. Since the adversary cannot compute this value, she needs to ensure
that P sends the correct output of the MAC function to V . This will only be the case if the adversary has
guessed the values si correctly during the pre-ask stage. Hence: PrMF|pre =
(
1
2
)n
[20].
Post-ask strategy (mafia fraud) Similarly, the adversary needs to ensure that P sends the correct output
of MACK . This will only be the case if she guessed all correct ri values in advance: PrMF|post =
(
1
2
)n
[20].
Without loss of generality, we assume that P wants to perform a distance fraud (the distance fraud
success probability of V is equal to the one of P ).
Early-reply strategy with one run (distance fraud) The responses αi are computed by XORing the
values of the responses ri, which are completely controlled by the adversary, and the challenges βi. The
latter are uniformly distributed, and the values αi inherit the same statistical distribution. So even if the
adversary fully controls her hardware, the best strategy is to guess the challenges βi in advance. We have
thus: PrDF|WB(1)|early =
(
1
2
)n
.
Early-reply strategy with p runs (distance fraud) Similarly to Algorithm 1, no cryptographic func-
tion is used to compute registers, and so: PrDF|WB(p)|early = PrDF|WB(1)|early.
We assume that the fraudulent party that performs the distance fraud is P .
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Pre-ask combined with early-reply strategy (distance fraud) The best strategy consists in guessing
the n challenges βi. By querying itself in advance, the prover learns the values ri, and computes the responses
αi. The adversary uses these responses in the early-reply strategy. They are correct when the values βi were
guessed correctly and consequently the MAC computed by the prover in the second slow phase is correct as
well. If one of the challenges is guessed incorrectly, the prover will compute incorrect values si, and MACK(.)
will be wrong. The distance fraud success probability is: PrDF|BB|pre&early =
(
1
2
)n
.
Post-ask combined with early-reply strategy (distance fraud) The adversary has no information
on the bits ri. The best strategy is to send n random responses αi. In each round, the adversary has a 1/2
probability of being successful. This occurs when both ri and βi are guessed correctly, or when both guesses
were wrong. When one of these values is correct and the other one is incorrect, the response of the adversary
will be wrong. As a result, the distance fraud success probability is: PrDF|BB|post&early =
(
1
2
)n
.
This protocol is not designed to resist to terrorist fraud in the white box model. Indeed, the prover
without revealing her secret K, gives her accomplice the output of the commitment, and the values αi and
r′, or βi and s′. After the fast phase, the accomplice gives the observed values si or ri to the prover, who
can then computes the MAC. This output is then sent back to the accomplice, who finally forwards it to the
verifier. Hence: PrTF|WB = 1 [50].
5 Hancke and Kuhn’s Protocol (2005)
In 2005 Hancke and Kuhn published the first distance-bounding protocol [42] (Algorithm ?? – See Ap-
pendix A) clearly dedicated to RFID. The protocol relies on the original ideas of Desmedt et al. [28, 10] but
is different from Brands and Chaum’s work [17] in the sense that Hancke and Kuhn’s protocol does not have
any final signature after the fast phase.
The common attack consists in guessing all the answers during the fast phase: PrImp =
(
1
2
)n
.
Pre-ask strategy (mafia fraud) We have: PrMF|pre =
(
3
4
)n
[42].
Post-ask strategy (mafia fraud) This protocol does not contain any second slow phase and the first
slow phase consists of nonce exchanges only. As per Section 2 we have: PrMF|post = PrImp.
Early-reply strategy with one run (distance fraud) We have: PrDF|WB(1)|early =
(
3
4
)n
[69].
Early-reply strategy with p runs (distance fraud) The formula expressing the attack success prob-
ability for this strategy was originally presented in [2], but it contained a typing error. The correct formula
is:
PrDF|WB(p)|early =
1
2pn
·
i=n−1∑
i=0
(
1
2
)i
·
j=n∑
j=i
(
n
j
)p−
 j=n∑
j=i+1
(
n
j
)p+(1
2
)n .
Pre-ask combined with early-reply strategy (distance fraud) With the pre-ask strategy, the ad-
versary learns half of the possible responses. However, she does not know the challenge, so when she sends
her responses in advance, two situations can occur: 1) the verifier asks her the same challenge that she asked
the prover and therefore her response is correct, 2) the verifier sends a different challenge in which case
she succeeds if the two possible responses were the same, i.e., her response is the same as the alternative
response, and fails if the possible responses are different. Hence, the distance fraud success probability is:
PrDF|BB|pre&early =
(
3
4
)n
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Post-ask combined with early-reply strategy (distance fraud) This protocol does not contain any
second slow phase and the first slow phase consists of nonce exchanges only. As per Section 2 we have:
PrDF|BB|post&early = PrImp.
This protocol is not designed to resist to terrorist fraud in the white box model. Indeed, the prover is
able to provide to his accomplice the two registers required to successfully execute the protocol, without
revealing his secret K: PrTF|WB = 1 [50].
6 Bussard and Bagga’s Protocol (2005)
Bussard and Bagga published the DBPK-Log protocol (Algorithm 3 – See Appendix A), which is a distance-
bounding protocol based on a proof of knowledge and a commitment scheme [18].
In [18], the authors described a statistical key recovery attack. They established the success probability
of this attack: PrImp = (1/2)
−4m′ , where m′ is a security parameter.
Pre-ask strategy (mafia fraud) The adversary must pass the final slow phase to defeat the protocol.
Forging the Open function is definitely not the best option. Instead the adversary should try to send the
correct challenges to the prover during the pre-ask attack, and then relay the final slow phases. Her success
probability with such a strategy is: PrMF|pre = (1/2)n.
Post-ask strategy (mafia fraud) Due to the presence of a complex second slow phase, the post-
ask strategy is as good as the pre-ask strategy against DBPK-Log, which yields the success probability:
PrMF|post = (1/2)n.
Early-reply strategy with one run (distance fraud) The adversary can search for a random R0 that
minimizes the Hamming distance between R0 and R1. Denoting a as the Hamming distance between R0 and
R1 (a = dH(R0, R1)), we have: PrDF|WB(1)|early = (1/2)a. This points out that the analysis provided in [18]
under-evaluates the success probability of the adversary because the white box model is not considered.
Let us consider the safe prime p = 59 (q = 29 and n = 6) and x = 27. If R0 = 32, then dH(R0, R1) = 1
and so the success probability is (1/2).
Early-reply strategy with p runs (distance fraud) Running the pseudo-random generator for choosing
R0 once, or several times, has no impact in the protocol security: the malicious prover can choose an appro-
priate value for R0 in order to maximize its success probability in distance fraud. Hence: PrDF|WB(p)|early =
PrDF|WB(1)|early.
Pre-ask combined with early-reply strategy (distance fraud) The adversary must succeed in the
second slow phase and has the same success probability as mafia fraud. We then have: PrDF|BB|pre&early =
(1/2)n.
Post-ask combined with early-reply strategy (distance fraud) The adversary must succeed in the
fast phase without the knowledge of the challenge. Then, the prover is queried by the adversary to gain
information for the final slow phase. Similar to mafia fraud, the success probability is: PrDF|BB|post&early =
(1/2)n.
Early-provide strategy with one run (terrorist fraud) This protocol is designed to resist to terrorist
fraud in the white box model. Indeed, the prover cannot reveal R0 and R1 without exposing the key, making
him able to provide only R0 or R1 to the external adversary. Note that the prover cannot try to optimize
the Hamming distance between R0 and R1 as in distance fraud.
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Remark 3 The probability of terrorist fraud calculated in [18] is lower than the one provided here. Indeed,
the authors considers that the final slow phase cannot be relayed by the adversary.
Early-provide strategy with p runs (terrorist fraud) Similarly to distance fraud strategy with early
provide one run, we have PrTF|WB(p) = PrTF|WB(1).
A Dedicated Distance Fraud and Terrorist Fraud
We describe here a distance fraud attack from [9]. The key idea is that a malicious prover could select
R0 ≈ x2 mod (p−1). That is, if x is even, he takes R0 = x2 and gets R1 = R0. Otherwise, he takes R0 = x±12
and get R1 = R0±1 so that R0 and R1 differ in their least significant bit only. He can then run the protocol
normally. We note that R0i = R
1
i except for one single round. So, the answers to the received challenges do
not depend on it, except in one round. By sending the answer before the challenge arrives, the malicious
prover can succeed in an early-reply strategy to run a distance fraud with a success probability larger than
1
2 .
The paper [9] also describes a terrorist fraud attack. The idea of the attack is that the malicious prover
starts the protocol but does not give the commit values. Instead, he computes z and discloses it to the
adversary through an early-provide strategy. The adversary will commit to random bits for R0i and R
1
i
except for round i = 1. Then, he guesses the value c1 and commit to a random bit for R
c1
1 . Finally, the
commit value for R1−c11 is adjusted so that the equation z =
∏n
i=1(Ci(R
0)Ci(R
1))2
i−1
mod p holds. Clearly,
the adversary can answer all challenges (if his guess for c1 is correct), since he knows the bits he committed
to. Next, he can get the help of the malicious prover to run the PK protocol through the slow phase. Due
to the zero-knowledge property of the PK protocol, this leaks no information about x. This attack works
with probability 12 (due to the guess of c1).
Finally, the paper [9] proposes some man-in-the-middle attacks against variants of this protocol which
are not using public-key cryptography, i.e., where PK is not used and x is shared.
7 Munilla and Peinado’s Protocol (2006)
Munilla and Peinado introduced in [54, 57] the concept of void challenges as a tool to improve distance-
bounding protocols. These void challenges can also be used to decrease the mafia fraud success probability
when applied to Hancke and Kuhn’s protocol [55], which is the case analyzed in this section. Thus, for this
protocol (Algorithm 4 – See Appendix A), the challenges can be 0, 1 or void, where a void challenge means
that no challenge is sent. Void challenges are used to detect a mafia fraud attack using the pre-ask strategy.
The adversary must guess the responses to the non-void challenges and the signature. Hence:
PrImp = (1− pf
2
)n · (1
2
)3n
Pre-ask strategy (mafia fraud) The calculation of the success probability of the pre-ask strategy is:
PrMF|pre =

(
1− pf
)n
if pf < 4/7(
pf · 3
4
)n
if pf ≥ 4/7
[2]
Note that PrMF|pre calculated in [2] and provided above is an approximation of the real value. Indeed,
once the adversary is detected by the device, she does not receive any useful information any more. However,
she can still guess the correct answers to be sent to the verifier. Given that being detected by the device
forces the adversary to guess the final signature, this case is nevertheless negligible (Section 2.1).
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Post-ask strategy (mafia fraud) The adversary must predict the correct responses to the non-void
challenges. We so have:
PrMF|post =
(
1− pf
2
)n
. [2]
Remark 4 (Best strategy) The best strategy is post-ask when pf < 4/5, and pre-ask when pf > 4/5.
Early-reply strategy with one run (distance fraud) When the challenge is not void, the adversary
can correctly respond to the verifier with probability 1 if R0i = R
1
i , and with probability 1/2 if R
0
i 6= R1i .
Consequently:
PrDF|WB(1)|early =
(
1− pf
4
)n
. [2]
Early-reply strategy with p runs (distance fraud) This strategy is efficient against the protocol if the
verifier sends his nonce first. This weakness can be easily fixed though. The success probability is provided
in [2]:
PrDF|WB(p)|early =
(
(1− pf ) + pf ·
(
1− 1
2
· E(dH(v
0, v1))
n
))n
where E(dH(R0, R1)) is the expected minimum Hamming distance between R0 and R1 for the non-void
challenges after the hash function is run p times with a different NP . We have: lim[PrDF|WB(p)|early] = 1
p→∞
.
Pre-ask combined with early-reply strategy (distance fraud) With the pre-ask strategy in the black
box model, the adversary carries out an attack similar to mafia fraud but on its own device: PrDF|BB|pre&early ≈
PrMF|pre. The approximation is due to a small difference in the two frauds as explained hereafter. As long
as the adversary is not detected by the device, she has the same strategy (and same probability of success)
in both mafia fraud and distance fraud. In particular, she no longer receives useful information from the
device once she is detected. However, in mafia fraud, she can still determine whether or not a round contains
a void challenge when communicating with the verifier, as she does not have time to get this information in
distance fraud attacks. The difference is however negligible because she has to guess the final signature in
both cases.
Post-ask combined with early-reply strategy (distance fraud) In this strategy, the adversary defi-
nitely obtains the correct final signature. However, she does not know when a void challenge or a non-void
challenge is expected. Therefore, if the probability of a non-void challenge is lower (resp. higher) than 2/3
then her best strategy is to keep quiet (resp. try to guess every response, with probability 1/2).
PrDF|BB|post&early =

(
1− pf
)n
if pf < 2/3(pf
2
)n
if pf ≥ 2/3
[2]
This protocol is not designed to resist to terrorist fraud in the white box model. Indeed, the prover,
without revealing his secret K, is able to provide to his accomplice the two registers required to successfully
complete the protocol. We so have: PrTF|WB = 1 [2].
7.1 Published Attacks
A technique to reduce the required memory [54] consists in using only one (n + 1)-bit register, where the
responses are selected from the two edges. However, [2] demonstrated that this technique opens the door to
an attack where the adversary queries in advance the two values of the edges.
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8 Kim, Avoine, Koeune, Standaert and Pereira’s Protocol (2008)
Kim, Avoine, Koeune, Standaert and Pereira introduced a protocol in [50] known as the Swiss-knife distance-
bounding protocol2 (Algorithm 5 – See Appendix A). We only consider in this analysis the case where T = 1,
that is when the protocol is not noise-resilient.
The attacker could impersonate the prover by guessing all the answers during the fast phase and TB in
the second slow phase. To succeed the adversary would need to guess σ + n bits. Therefore, it is better for
the adversary to guess K which size is σ. Consequently, we have: PrImp =
(
1
2
)σ
.
Pre-ask strategy (mafia fraud) The success probability of the pre-ask strategy is PrMF|pre =
(
1
2
)n
[50].
Post-ask strategy (mafia fraud) The adversary must guess the responses expected in the fast phase:
PrMF|post =
(
1
2
)n
.
Early-reply strategy with one run (distance fraud) As the prover can access to the internal state of
the registers, she knows the content of the two registers. If v0i = v
1
i , she always responds correctly, otherwise
she has to guess the correct answer with probability 12 . Hence, PrDF|WB(1)|early =
(
3
4
)n
.
Early-reply strategy with p runs (distance fraud) The Swiss-knife Protocol generates only one
register. Hence, multiple-run of PRF does not increase the adversary success probability: PrDF|WB(p)|early =
PrDF|WB(1)|early.
Pre-ask combined with early-reply strategy (distance fraud) The adversary sends her own chal-
lenges to the prover in advance. To obtain the correct signature in the second slow phase, the challenges
sent by the adversary must be the same as the challenges sent by the verifier. We consequently have:
PrDF|BB|pre&early =
(
1
2
)n
.
Post-ask combined with early-reply strategy (distance fraud) The adversary has to correctly guess
the response in each round. Hence: PrDF|BB|post&early =
(
1
2
)n
.
Early-provide strategy with one run (terrorist fraud) PrTF|WB(1) =
(
3
4
)n
[50].
Early-provide strategy with p runs (terrorist fraud) For the same reason given at Section 8:
PrTF|WB(p) = PrTF|WB(1).
8.1 Published Attacks
Peris-Lopez et al. proposed a passive full disclosure attack on the Swiss-knife RFID distance-bounding
protocol [60]. However, their assumption is not correct: they assume that the size of the secret key (K) and
random nonces (NV and NP ) are equal to n (number of iterations in the fast phase) and n is insecurely
short, for example 32 bits or less in the Swiss-knife protocol. Based on this assumption, they assert that
the Swiss-knife protocol is insecure. The authors of the Swiss-knife RFID distance-bounding protocol never
claimed that their protocol is secure when the size of the long-term key and random nonces are so short.
Under this assumption, all the distance-bounding protocols can be broken.
2Like Swiss-army knives used during WWII, the Swiss-knife protocol is a multi-purpose tool. The authors claim their protocol
“resists against both mafia fraud and terrorist attacks, reaches the best known false acceptance rate, preserves privacy, resists
to channel errors, uses symmetric-key cryptography only, requires no more than 2 cryptographic operations to be performed by
the tag, can take advantage of precomputation on the tag, and offers an optional mutual authentication” [50].
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9 Avoine and Tchamkerten’s Protocol (2009)
The protocol (Algorithm 6 – See Appendix A) introduced by Avoine and Tchamkerten in [7] is a general-
ization of Hancke and Kuhn’s protocol that is more secure in terms of mafia and distance fraud.
To impersonate a legitimate prover one needs to guess the c authentication bits and the n replies of the
fast phase. Hence: PrImp =
(
1
2
)c+n
.
Pre-ask strategy (mafia fraud) PrMF|pre = 2−n(d2 + 1)
n
d = 2−d·`(d2 + 1)
` with n = d` [7].
Post-ask strategy (mafia fraud) Without any final slow phase, a post-ask strategy is useless: PrMF|post =(
1
2
)c+n
.
Early-reply strategy with one run (distance fraud) The analysis of the distance fraud probability
in the case of the tree-based protocol is very similar to the analysis of the Poulidor protocol (Section 11)
that is provided in [69]. Unfortunately, this analysis only yields rough upper bounds. To find such an
upper bound on the adversary success probability for distance fraud for the tree-based protocol, Theorem 3
available in [69] is used. This theorem is related to Poulidor but the only difference between Poulidor and
the tree-based protocol is that the latter creates a full tree as graph. Therefore, the distance fraud success
probability of the tree-based protocol is upper bounded by:
1
2
(
1
2n
+
√
1
22n
− 4
2n
+ 4q
)
where q =
i=n∏
i=1
(
1
2
+
1
22i+1
k=2n−1∑
k=0
(Ai[0, k])2
)
.
The authors of [69] define Ai[0, k] for a tree, considering that the nodes in the tree are labeled between 0
and 2n − 1 using a breadth-first algorithm, then:
Ai[0, k] =
{
1 if 2i − 1 ≤ k < 2i+1 − 1,
0 otherwise,
and finally: q =
i=n∏
i=1
(
1
2
+
1
2i+1
)
.
Early-reply strategy with p runs (distance fraud) Similar to the Poulidor case (Section 11), this
strategy makes sense for this protocol but so far neither PrDF|WB(1)|early nor PrDF|WB(p)|early have been
calculated.
Pre-ask combined with early-reply strategy (distance fraud) PrDF|BB|pre&early = 2−n(d2 + 1)
n
d [7]
Post-ask combined with early-reply strategy (distance fraud) Note that the post-ask strategy will
not allow the adversary to gain any information, i.e., PrDF|BB|post&early =
(
1
2
)c+n
.
This protocol is not designed to resist to terrorist fraud in the white box model. An attacker can reveal
the tree node labelization to an accomplice who so successfully passes the fast phase with PrTF|WB = 1.
10 Rasmussen and Cˇapkun’s Protocol (2010)
The protocol (Algorithm 7 – See Appendix A) was introduced by Rasmussen and Cˇapkun and originally
appeared in [61]. In this paper we consider the updated version that appeared in [62].
We assume here that key size and nonce size are large enough to ensure that the probability of a key-
recovery attack and a replay attack are negligible. The easiest manner to impersonate a prover is by forging
the final signature. The success probability of this attack is: PrImp =
(
1
2
)σ
.
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Pre-ask strategy (mafia fraud) In order to implement a mafia fraud attack using a pre-ask strategy
an attacker has to guess the nonce NV of the verifier. Otherwise the final signature will not be valid. So,
PrMF|pre =
(
1
2
)δV
.
Post-ask strategy (mafia fraud) An attacker wishing to execute a mafia fraud attack must guess all
the bits of the prover’s nonce in order to be able to reply correctly. Thus, PrMF|post =
(
1
2
)δP
.
Early-reply strategy with one run (distance fraud) A malicious prover wishing to execute a distance
fraud attack must guess all the bits of the verifier’s nonce to reply correctly. Hence: PrDF|WB(1)|early =(
1
2
)δV
[62].
Early-reply strategy with p runs (distance fraud) The concept of round does not exist in this
protocol, therefore: PrDF|WB(p)|early = PrDF|WB(1)|early.
The security of this protocol does not depend on a well behaved prover. Consequently black-box success
probabilities are the same as in the white-box model.
This protocol is not designed to resist to terrorist fraud in the white box model. Indeed, the prover
without revealing his secret K, is able to provide his accomplice with NP , which is sufficient to successfully
execute the fast phase. Hence, PrTF|WB = 1.
11 Trujillo-Rasua, Martin and Avoine’s Protocol (2010)
Poulidor, the graph-based distance-bounding protocol (Algorithm 8 – See Appendix A) designed by Trujillo-
Rasua, Martin, and Avoine [69], uses specific node and edge dependencies in the tree of the AT protocol [7]
– which then can alternatively be represented by an acyclic graph. Poulidor benefits from a lower memory
requirement compared to the AT protocol. Security is also reduced.
The common manner to impersonate a prover is by guessing all the answers during the fast phase. Hence,
we have: PrImp =
(
1
2
)n
.
Pre-ask strategy (mafia fraud) Let:
g(i, j, k) =
1
2
+
1
2j+i−2k+2
×
t=2n−1∑
t=0
(
Aj−t[1, t]Ai−t[2, t] +Aj−k[2, t]Ai−k[1, t]
)
where A is the adjacency matrix of the graph which represents the graph-based protocol [69]. Also, let:
f(i, j, k) =

1 if j < k and i = j,
1
2 if j < k and i 6= j,
1
2 if j ≥ k and i < k,
g(i, j, k) if j ≥ k and i ≥ k.
We then have: PrMF|pre =
k=n∑
k=1
1
2k
j=n∏
j=k
max(f(1, j, k), · · · , f(n, j, k))
+ 1
2n
. [69]
Post-ask strategy (mafia fraud) This protocol does not contain any second slow phase and the first
slow phase consists of nonce exchanges only. As per Section 2 we have: PrMF|post = PrImp.
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Early-reply strategy with one run (distance fraud) PrDF|WB(1)|early is upper bounded by [69]:
1
2
(
1
2n
+
√
1
22n
− 4
2n
+ 4q
)
where q =
i=n∏
i=1
(
1
2
+
1
22i+1
k=2n−1∑
k=0
(Ai[0, k])2
)
Computing in a similar way than in [69], we find the following relation for Ai[0, k]:
Ai[0, k] =
{ (
i
k−i
)
if i ≤ k ≤ 2i,
0 otherwise,
and finally: q =
i=n∏
i=1
(
1
2
+
(
2i
i
)
22i+1
)
.
Remark that finding an exact value for PrDF|WB(1)|early is an NP-hard problem [68].
Early-reply strategy with p runs (distance fraud) This strategy makes sense for this protocol, but
so far, neither has been computed PrDF|WB(1)|early nor can be computed PrDF|WB(p)|early.
Pre-ask combined with early-reply strategy (distance fraud) With the pre-ask strategy, the adver-
sary may learn the values of a walk in the graph. Note that, this is exactly the same knowledge obtained for
an adversary attempting to perform a mafia fraud attack by using the pre-ask strategy. However, contrary to
the mafia fraud attack, the adversary does not receive any challenge from the verifier when she is performing
a distance fraud attack. We consequently have PrDF|BB|pre&early ≤ PrMF|pre. The equality of this equation
holds when the adversary actually receives every challenge before sending its corresponding response, i.e.,
when the adversary is in the close vicinity of the verifier.
Post-ask combined with early-reply strategy (distance fraud) PrDF|BB|post&early = PrImp.
This protocol is not designed to resist to terrorist fraud in the white box model. Indeed, the prover is
able, without revealing his secret K, to provide his accomplice with the graph required to successfully pass
thorough the protocol. Hence: PrTF|WB = 1.
12 Kim and Avoine’s Protocol (KA2) (2011)
Kim and Avoine introduced in 2009 a distance-bounding protocol with mixed challenges [48], namely chal-
lenges known and challenges unknown in advance by the prover. Challenges known in advance allow the
prover to help the verifier to detect an attack, but these challenges also allow the prover to succeed in per-
forming a distance fraud. Kim and Avoine improved their protocol in 2011, yielding a new variant known
as KA2 [49], which is analyzed in this section (Algorithm 9 – See Appendix A).
Guessing the n answers ri is enough to impersonate the prover: PrImp =
(
1
2
)n
.
Pre-ask strategy (mafia fraud) PrMF|pre =
(
3
4
)n−α ( 1
2
)α
+ α
(
1
2
)n+1
[49].
Post-ask strategy (mafia fraud) This protocol does not contain any second slow phase and the first
slow phase consists of nonce exchanges only. As per Section 2 we have: PrMF|post = PrImp.
Early-reply strategy with one run (distance fraud) PrDF|WB(1)|early =
(
3
4
)n−α
[49].
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Early-reply strategy with p runs (distance fraud) The success probability in case of early-reply
strategy with p runs of the pseudo-random function is provided in [2]:
1
2p(n−α)
·
i=n−α−1∑
i=0
(
1
2
)i
·
j=n−α∑
j=i
(
n− α
j
)p−
j=n−α∑
j=i+1
(
n− α
j
)p+(1
2
)n .
Pre-ask combined with early-reply strategy (distance fraud) As with mafia fraud with pre-ask
strategy, the success probability is PrDF|BB|pre&early = PrMF|pre.
Post-ask combined with early-reply strategy (distance fraud) This protocol does not contain any
second slow phase and the first slow phase consists of nonce exchanges only. As per Section 2 we have:
PrDF|BB|post&early = PrImp.
This protocol is not designed to resist to terrorist fraud in the white box model. The prover can give the
registers to his accomplice to successfully pass the protocol: PrTF|WB = 1.
13 Yum, Kim, Hong and Lee’s Protocol (2010)
Yum, Kim, Hon and Lee created a distance-bounding protocol with mutual authentication [76].
The only known way to succeed at the impersonation consists of guessing all the answers during the fast
phase, which leads to the probability PrImp =
(
1
2
)n
.
Pre-ask strategy (mafia fraud) Avoine and Kim proposed a new attack that yields a higher adversary
success probability [4]. Their attack depends on the probability of finding Di’s, PrD, which varies according
to the system parameters. Following this attack, the success probability of a mafia fraud attack is at least:
PrMF|pre =
{
( 58 )
n +
∑n
i=1
1
4 · ( 58 )i−1 · ( 34 )n−i, if PrD = 1
( 12 )
n +
∑n
i=1
3
8 · ( 12 )i−1 · ( 58 )n−i, if PrD = 34
. [4]
Post-ask strategy (mafia fraud) This protocol does not contain any second slow phase and the first
slow phase consists of nonce exchanges only. As per Section 2 we have: PrMF|post = PrImp.
Early-reply strategy with one run (distance fraud) PrDF|WB(1)|early =
(
7
8
)n
[76].
Early-reply strategy with p runs (distance fraud) An attacker who impersonates B wins when
Di = 1 or R
0
i = R
1
i . Indeed, when Di = 1, the prover sends a challenge to the verifier (A) and so trivially
wins the round. When Di = 0, the roles are inverted. To win a round, the prover must send his response in
advance. When R0i = R
1
i , the potential answers are the same and the prover definitely wins. Running the
cryptographic function p times allows the prover to find D with a higher Hamming weight than the average
one, and R0 and R1 with a lower Hamming distance. In conclusion, the probability of success is higher with
the YKHL Protocol than with the HK protocol, where the prover wins only when R0i = R
1
i . The probability
of success can be calculated by considering Pr(X = x) =
(
n
x
)
( 14 )
x( 34 )
n−x/23n instead of Pr(X = x) =
(
n
x
)
/2n
in [2].
Pre-ask combined with early-reply strategy (distance fraud) A distance fraud attack with the
pre-ask strategy is similar to a mafia fraud in this case. Hence: PrDF|BB|pre&early = PrMF|pre.
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Post-ask combined with early-reply strategy (distance fraud) This protocol does not contain any
second slow phase and the first slow phase consists of nonce exchanges only. As per Section 2 we have:
PrDF|BB|post&early = PrImp.
This protocol is not designed to resist to terrorist fraud in the white box model. Indeed, the prover can
give the registers to his accomplice to successfully pass the protocol: PrTF|WB = 1.
13.1 Published Attacks
Avoine and Kim demonstrated in [4] that the security of YKHL protocol is far below what is claimed in [76]
and could be worse than the HK protocol w.r.t. mafia fraud resistance.
14 SKI Protocols (2013)
In [16, 15, 14], the authors introduced a series of protocols called SKI. These protocols are presented in
Algorithm 11.
The only known way to do this attack is to guess all the answers during the fast phase. So: PrImp =
(
1
q
)n
.
Pre-ask strategy (mafia fraud) With this strategy, the adversary can obtain one set of answers from
the prover before executing the fast phase with the verifier. Without loss of generality, we assume that
he obtains {F (1, a1,K ′1), . . . , F (1, an,K ′n)}, i.e., the answers corresponding to the challenges ci’s equal to
1. Hence, at each rounds two cases occur: (a) the verifier’s challenge is 1 and she knows the answer, this
happens with probability 1/t, or (b) the verifier’s challenge is not 1, thus she has to guess the answer, and
succeeds with probability 1/q. Thus, the rounds independence yields to:
PrMF|pre =
(
1
t
· 1 + (1− 1
t
) · 1
q
)n
=
(
q + t− 1
qt
)n
. For SKIpro, this is
(
2
3
)n
.
Post-ask strategy (mafia fraud) This protocol does not contain any second slow phase and the first
slow phase consists of nonce exchanges only. As per Section 2 we have: PrMF|post = PrImp.
Early-reply strategy with one run (distance fraud) Using this strategy, the adversary has to send
her answers in advance. Due to the similarity between Hancke and Kuhn’s protocol and SKI’s protocol, the
adversary applies a similar strategy to maximize her success probability. At each rounds she answers the
most probable value among the possible registers. The most probable answer for a given round is the one
that appears the most within the set {F (1, ai,K ′i), F (2, ai,K ′i), . . . , F (t, ai,K ′i)} of possible answers for this
round. In order to compute the adversary success probability, let define the following events:
 W: the adversary provides the correct answer to the verifier at a given round.
 Bj : j = max
1≤l≤q
{Xl},
where Xl is the number of appearance times of the l-th element from Fq among the set
{F (1, ai,K ′i), F (2, ai,K ′i), . . . , F (t, ai,K ′i)}.
We then trivially have: Pr(W) = ∑j=tj=1 Pr(W|Bj) Pr(Bj), with Pr(W|Bi) = it . Thus, using the above
equation, we deduce: Pr(W) = E
(
max
1≤l≤q
{Xl}
)
· 1t . The tricky task consists in computing E( max1≤l≤q{Xl}).
This is done below for the SKI protocol configurations suggested in [14].
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 q = 2, and t = 2: E( max
1≤l≤q
{Xl}) = 32 , and Pr(W) = 34 .
 q = 2, and t = 3: E( max
1≤l≤q
{Xl}) = 94 and Pr(W) = 34 .
 q = 2, and t = 4: E( max
1≤l≤q
{Xl}) = 3 and Pr(W) = 34 .
 q = 4, and t = 3: E( max
1≤l≤q
{Xl}) = 158 and Pr(W) = 58 .
Finally, the independence of the rounds provides PrDF|WB(1)|early = (Pr(W))n. For SKIpro, this is
(
3
4
)n
.
Early-reply strategy with p runs (distance fraud) This strategy does not make sense against these
protocols. Indeed, since the prover does not have the verifier’s nonce before he sends its, he cannot compute
several outputs of the the pseudo-random function.
Pre-ask combined with early-reply strategy (distance fraud) Distance fraud with the pre-ask
strategy is here similar to mafia fraud. Hence: PrDF|BB|pre&early = PrMF|pre.
Post-ask combined with early-reply strategy (distance fraud) This protocol does not contain any
second slow phase and the first slow phase consists of nonce exchanges only. As per Section 2 we have:
PrDF|BB|post&early = PrImp.
Early-provide strategy with one run (terrorist fraud) Using this strategy, the adversary obtains
register(s) before the start of the fast phase. First, note that the setting in which t′ = t = q = 2 (i.e., SKIlite)
does not resist against terrorist fraud. Second, to compute the success probability in the other cases, let
denote k, the number of registers given by the prover to the adversary. As stated in [5], the insurance that
no information could leak, is furnished by the following equality: k = t− 2.
Once the adversary gets the t− 2 registers, she starts the fast phase with the verifier. Two cases occur,
(a) the verifier asks an answer coming from one of the t− 2 known registers. Thus, the adversary definitely
knows the correct answer. Or (b) the verifier asks her an answer coming from one the two unknown registers,
and she has to guess the correct answer. The adversary consequently succeeds with probability 1q . Given
the rounds are independent, we finally have:
PrTF|WB(1) =
(
t− 2
t
· 1 + 2
t
· 1
q
)n
=
(
qt+ 2(1− q)
qt
)n
. For SKIpro, this is
(
2
3
)n
.
Early-provide strategy with p runs (terrorist fraud) This strategy does not make sense against these
protocols. Indeed, since the prover does not have the verifier’s nonce before he sends its answers, he cannot
compute several outputs of the the pseudo-random function.
15 Protocol Comparison
This section summarises the properties of the introduced protocols. Because looking at individual properties
is tedious and often meaningless, we use here a comparison method, formalised in [6], that clusters protocols
with similar features and highlights those clusters with properties that are not present in others.
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15.1 Summary of Properties and Performance
Table 5 presents the properties and performance of every protocol analyzed through Sections 3 to 14. The
description of the properties is provided in Section 2. Table 6 and 7 summarize which cryptographic building
blocks are used and which security properties are expected by each considered protocol. Greyed cells in
Table 7 contain results already known, while other cells contain values provided by this survey.
Table 5: Properties and performance
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BC No No Yes Yes 2`+ n 2n 2n
MAD No Yes Yes No 2(`+ δ + σ) 2n 2n
HK No No No Yes 2δ 2n 2n
MP No Yes Yes Yes 2δ + 3n 2(n− nvoid) 3n
Swiss-knife No Option Yes Yes 2(δ + σ) + n 2n 3n+ 2δ
(+σ if mutual)
Tree-based No No No No iff d ≥ 2 2δ + c 2n `(2d+1 − 2)
RC No No Yes No rounds σ 2δV δV + δP
Poulidor No (*) No No No 2δ 2n 4n
KA2 Yes Yes No Yes 2δ 2n 2n
YKHL No Yes No Yes 2δ 2n 3n
SKIpro No No No Yes 2δ + 2n 3n 2n
(*) See Section 11 for a refined analysis about the adaptiveness.
Table 6: Cryptographic building blocks
Protocol PRNG Sym. Primitive Commitment Signature
BC Yes Yes Yes
MAD Yes Yes
HK Yes Yes
MP Yes Yes
Swiss-knife Yes Yes
Tree-based Yes Yes
RC Yes Yes Yes
Poulidor Yes Yes
KA2 Yes Yes
YKHL Yes Yes
SKI Yes Yes
When looking at the properties summarised in Table 5, 6 and 7 we observe that, for example, only two
protocols resist all attacks with probability lower than 1: Swiss-knife and SKI. However, we are interested
on a holistic and systematic analysis that accounts for (arguable) the most important features of distance
bounding protocols. We provide such an approach next.
15.2 Cluster-based Comparison
Comparing distance-bounding protocols is quite a tricky task given the large number of parameters that can
be considered. A given protocol P1 can be better in terms of resistance against mafia fraud than another
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Table 7: Adversary success probabilities
Protocol Imp Mafia Distance Terrorist
pre-ask post-ask early-reply pre & early post & early early-provide
BB BB WB(1) WB(p) BB BB WB(1)WB(p)
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(
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2
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4
)n
Sect. 5
(
1
2
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4
)n
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MP (1−
pf
2 )
n
×( 12 )3n
(
1− pf
)n
if pf <
4
7(
pf · 3
4
)n
if pf ≥ 47
(
1− pf2
)n (
1− pf4
)n ((1− pf ) +
pf ·
(
1− E(dH(v0,v1))2n
))n
(
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)n
if pf <
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protocol P2, but at the same time worse in terms of resistance against distance fraud. Thus, ranking P1 and
P2 is very complicated. This section introduces a hierarchical clustering of the distance-bounding protocols.
The key-point of the method relies on the observation that a protocol P1 is undeniably better than a protocol
P2 if and only if P1 is better than P2 for every considered parameter. In such a case, P1 should be used,
instead of P2, whatever the considered scenario.
Seven parameters are considered for the cluster-based comparison: mafia fraud resistance (Ma), terrorist
fraud resistance (T ), distance fraud resistance (D), the presence of a final slow phase (L), single bit exchanges
during the fast phase (B), the number of bits exchanged by the two parties during the whole protocol3 (E),
and the memory dependency on the prover side regarding the number of rounds (Me). Each parameter
can be assigned with a value belonging to an (obviously) ordered set. For example, it is clearly better for a
protocol to have a mafia fraud success probability equal to ( 12 )
n than ( 34 )
n. Also, it is better not to need a
final slow phase in the protocol, and to use binary messages than ternary messages, etc. For each parameter,
the values can be ordered: (Value 6) ≺ (Value 5) ≺ (Value 4) ≺ (Value 3) ≺ (Value 2) ≺ (Value 1), where
(Value i) ≺ (Value j) means that (Value j) is better than (Value i) or, said differently, (Value j) is more
convenient than (Value i) when implementing a distance-bounding protocol. The parameters and their values
are provided in Table 8.
3Note that in Table 8, no value is given to the constant. Since we are interested in how the number of exchanged bits scales
the number of rounds, the actual value of the constant does not really matter.
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The configuration of a protocol is an element of the Cartesian productMa×T ×D×L×B×E×Me. All
the possible configurations can be deduced from Table 8, and the configuration of each protocol presented in
this work is provided in Table 9. Note that there is no total order relation inMa×T ×D×L×B×E ×Me,
but a configuration (ma,d, t, l,b,e,me) is better than a configuration (ma′,d′, t′, l′,b′,e′,me′) if it is better
for every considered parameter: ma′ ≺ ma, d′ ≺ d, ..., me′ ≺ me. As a consequence, there exist several best
configurations in Ma× T ×D × L× B × E ×Me.
A cluster is a set (possibly empty) of protocols which have the same configuration (ma,d, t, l,b,e,me).
A cluster is said to be better than another one if its configuration is better. The total number of clusters is
large; it is actually equal to the cardinality of Ma× T ×D × L× B × E ×Me, which is 63 · 22 · 32 = 7776.
However, 5774 clusters are empty, meaning that no protocol matches the configuration of these clusters.
The remaining 2002 non-empty clusters still represent a large amount of information, which is difficult to
condense in a paper. To further reduce this information, only best configurations are kept.
This process can be easily automated. A hierarchy of clusters is built and the best cluster of every branch
is kept. After performing this operation, only 5 clusters remain: {Poulidor}, {Swiss-Knife}, {SKIshamir},
{RC}, and {BC, MAD}. Four of the remaining clusters are actually singletons, which means that among
all the published protocols, none of them are equivalent with respect to the seven considered parameters.
In the remaining cluster, {BC, MAD}, BC and MAD are equivalent since the mutual authentication is not
considered in the configurations. We can also raise that, given constraints on memory, probabilities, etc. the
best known protocol to be used belongs to these 6 finalists.
It is finally interesting to compare these 6 finalists with the distance-bounding evolution provided in
Figure 1. A protocol that is not a finalist should not necessarily be blamed: most of them have been useful
at some point and led to more evolved protocols. However, protocols published today should be new finalists
in the cluster-based comparison, possibly after considering additional parameters in the comparison.
16 Conclusion
Distance-bounding authentication protocols represent a new class of protocols aiming to thwart distance-
based attacks whose feasibility is rendered possible by emerging technologies. This survey provides a thorough
state-of-the-art of existing protocols and introduces refined security analyses. The comparisons made provide
designers with new means to evaluate their performance in a unified manner according to several security
and resource parameters. It may be worthwhile pointing out that the provided cluster-based comparison
can easily be modified to better reflect specific practical considerations and/or to include other protocols.
Finally, we are aware that attacks other than those considered in this paper might exist. Addressing provable
security of distance-bounding protocols is therefore a challenge for future research.
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17 Supplementary materials: Appendix A
This section provides the full description of the protocols considered in this paper.
17.1 Brands and Chaum’s Protocol (1993)
In 1993, Brands and Chaum designed several distance-bounding protocols [17]. This analysis focuses on
their protocol (Algorithm 1) that mitigates both mafia fraud and distance fraud.
Algorithm 1: Brands and Chaum’s Protocol
Verifier Prover
(prover’s public key Kv) (prover’s private key Ks)
Commit(m1|| . . . ||mn)←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− mi ∈R {0, 1}[
Pick ci ∈R {0, 1} and Start
Timer
ci−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Stop Timer
ri←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− ri = mi ⊕ ci
Open(Commit), SignKs
(c1||r1|| . . .)←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Check ri and ∆ti ≤ tmax for
1 ≤ i ≤ n, then Verify SignKs
Initialization The prover should own a signature public/private key.
Protocol The prover randomly generates n commitment bits mi ∈R {0, 1} and the verifier randomly
generates n challenge bits ci ∈R {0, 1} (i = 1 . . . n). The prover commits on m1|| . . . ||mn and sends this
commitment to the verifier. Then, a phase of n rapid bit exchanges starts. In each round, the verifier starts
his timer and sends ci to the prover, who replies with ri = ci⊕mi. Upon receiving the response bit the verifier
stops its timer. Finally, the prover concatenates ci and ri, signs the 2n bits result, Signk(c1||r1|| . . . ||cn||rn),
and sends it to the verifier together with the opening of the commitment.
Final Decision Upon reception of the signature, the verifier concatenates the 2n bits ci and ri, and verifies
the received signature, the commitment, the measured ∆ti’s and whether ri = ci ⊕mi for i = 1 . . . n.
Table 10: Parameters and functions (Algorithm 1)
n Number of iterations in the fast phase
` Lower bound for the size of the commitment and the signature (` >> n)
tmax Threshold of the round-trip time
Commit Secure commitment function that outputs ` bits
SignKs Signature function whose private key is Ks
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17.2 Cˇapkun, Buttya´n, and Hubaux’s Protocol (2003)
In 2003, Cˇapkun, Buttya´n, and Hubaux introduced MAD [20], a protocol that works quite similarly to the
BC protocol [17], but provides mutual authentication. Although denoted by P and V , the two parties act
as both prover and verifier during the execution of the protocol (Algorithm 2). The notations used in [20]
are kept in the description below.
Algorithm 2: MAD Protocol
Prover Verifier
(secret K) (secret K)
Pick r′ ∈R {0, 1}δ
and r ∈R {0, 1}n
Pick s′ ∈R {0, 1}δ
and s ∈R {0, 1}n
h(r||r′)−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
h(s||s′)←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
α1 = r1
Start Timer
α1−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
β1 = s1 ⊕ α1
Stop Timer
β1←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− Start timer
.
.
.
αi = ri ⊕ βi−1
Start Timer
αi−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ Stop timer
βi = si ⊕ αi
Stop Timer
βi←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− Start timer
.
.
.
αn = rn ⊕ βn−1
Start Timer
αn−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ Stop timer
βn = sn ⊕ αn
Stop Timer
βn←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Compute si = αi ⊕ βi for
1 ≤ i ≤ n and µP =
MACK(IDP ||IDV ||r1||s1|| . . . ||rn||sn)
Compute r1 = α1,
ri = αi ⊕ βi−1 (i > 1) and
µV = MACK
(IDV ||IDP ||s1||r1|| . . . ||sn||rn)
r′||µP−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
s′||µV←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Verify h(s||s′) and µV Verify h(r||r′) and µP
Check ∆ti ≤ tmax (1 ≤ i ≤ n) Check ∆ti ≤ tmax (1 ≤ i ≤ n)
Initialization Prior to the protocol execution, the two parties (P and V ) agree on the security parameters
and functions described in Table 11, and a common secret key K.
Protocol In the first slow phase, P and V generate two random numbers (r, r′ and s, s′ respectively)
and send a commitment to the other party on the two random numbers (h(r||r′) and h(s||s′) respectively).
During the fast phase the following steps are repeated n times:
 P sends the bit αi to V , where α1 = r1 and αi = ri ⊕ βi−1 for i > 1;
 V sends the bit βi = si ⊕ αi to P .
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In the second slow phase, P retrieves the bit sequence s by assuming that si = αi ⊕ βi for every i ∈
{1, 2, · · · , n} and computes using the secret key K the value µP = MACK(IDP ||IDV ||r1||s1|| . . . ||rn||sn).
Similarly, V computes the bits r1 = α1 and ri = αi ⊕ βi−1 for i > 1, with which V computes µV =
MACK(IDV ||IDP ||s1||r1|| . . . ||sn||rn). Finally, P and V open the commitment sent in the first slow phase
by transmitting r′ and s′, and exchange the values µP and µV .
Final Decision The users P and V accept each other’s entity only if:
 the n responses of the fast phase are correct,
 the commitment that was sent in the first slow phase is correctly opened in the second slow phase and
corresponds to the bit sequence (r or s) exchanged during the fast phase,
 the output of the MAC function is correct, and
 the time constraint ∆ti ≤ tmax is met for i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} and some threshold tmax > 0.
Table 11: Parameters and functions (Algorithm 2)
n Number of iterations in the fast phase, which is also the size of the random numbers r and s
δ Size of the random numbers r′ and s′
κ Size of the secret key K
tmax Threshold of the round-trip time
MACK MAC function keyed with K
σ Output size of the MAC function
h Collision-resistant one-way hash function used to compute the commitment
17.3 Hancke and Kuhn’s Protocol (2005)
In 2005 Hancke and Kuhn published the first distance-bounding protocol [42] (Algorithm ??) clearly dedi-
cated to RFID. The protocol relies on the original ideas of Desmedt et al. [28, 10] but is different from Brands
and Chaum’s work [17] in the sense that Hancke and Kuhn’s protocol does not have any final signature after
the fast phase.
Initialization Prior to the protocol execution, the legitimate prover and the verifier agree on the security
parameters and functions described in Table 12, and a common secret key K.
Protocol During the slow phase, the verifier sends to the prover a nonce NV and the prover sends to the
verifier a nonce NP . Both the prover and the verifier then use the pseudo-random function h and the secret
key K in order to generate two n-bit sequences R0 and R1. For each of the n rounds of the fast phase,
the verifier generates and sends a random challenge bit ci, and the prover replies instantly with a one-bit
response that is either R0i or R
1
i , selected by the value of ci.
Final Decision The verifier accepts the prover’s identity only if the n responses of the fast phase are
correct while meeting the time constraint ∆ti ≤ tmax, i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, for some threshold tmax > 0.
17.4 Bussard and Bagga’s Protocol (2005)
Bussard and Bagga published the DBPK-Log protocol (Algorithm 3), which is a distance-bounding protocol
based on a proof of knowledge and a commitment scheme [18].
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Table 12: Parameters and functions (Algorithm ??)
n Number of iterations in the fast phase
κ Size of the secret key K
δ Size of nonces NV and NP
tmax Threshold of the round-trip time
h Hash function whose output size is 2n
Algorithm 3: DBPK-Log Protocol
Verifier Prover
(prover’s public key y) (prover’s private key x)
Pick R0 ∈R {0, 1}n
Compute R1 = ER0 (x) =
x− R0 mod (p− 1)
Compute ∀i ∈ [0, n− 1]:
Ci(R
0) = Commit(R0i )
Ci(R
1) = Commit(R1i )
∀i, Ci(R0)Ci(R1)←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−[
Pick ci ∈ {0, 1} and Start
Timer
ci−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Stop Timer
ri←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− ri = Rcii
Check ri = R
ci
i
Open(R
ci
i
)←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
PK[(x, v) : z = Ω(x, v) ∧ y = Γ(x)]
←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Initialization Prior to protocol execution, the prover and the verifier agree on the security parameters
and functions described in Table 13. A trusted authority then chooses and publishes the following values:
p, a large safe prime such that p = 2q + 1 with q a large prime; g, a generator of Z?p; and h, a random value
in Z?p. Once done, the prover selects a secret x ∈ Zp−1 \ {q} and the trusted authority then needs to create
and publish a certificate for his public key y = gx.
Protocol The prover P possesses a private key x which is an odd secret, randomly chosen in Zp−1 \ {q},
whose corresponding public key is y = gx mod p. The prover picks a random one-time key R0 ∈ {0, 1}n,
and encrypts his private key x with R0, using the encryption scheme E, i.e., he gets R1 = ER0(x) =
x − R0 mod (p − 1). The prover then commits to each bit of R0 and R1 independently using the Commit
function (see Remark 5). Then, for each of the n rounds of the fast phase, the verifier generates and sends
a random challenge bit ci, and the prover replies instantly with a 1-bit response that is either R
0
i or R
1
i ,
selected by the value ci. A second slow phase then starts, where the prover allows the verifier to open the
commitment of each bit Rcii , for each challenge ci that has been sent in the previous phase.
Final Decision The verifier checks the timing and verifies that the received values correspond to the
committed ones (Open function is described in the original paper). A verification protocol is finally executed
between P and V using a proof of knowledge. Note that [18] only states that “at the end of distance-bounding
stage, the verifier V is able to compute an upper bound on the distance to P .”
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Table 13: Parameters and functions (Algorithm 3)
n Number of iterations in the fast phase, n = m+m′
m Security parameter m = dlog2 pe
m′ Security parameter
E Encryption scheme (additive cipher): E(x) = x− k mod (p− 1)
Commit Commit function of the commitment scheme
Open Open function of the commitment scheme
PK[(x, v) : z = Ω(x, v) ∧ y = Γ(x)] Proof of knowledge for x and v
Remark 5 (Commitment) The suggested Commit function works as follows: (a) a value h is randomly
chosen in Z?p, (b) the values vR0,i and vR1,i, ∀i ∈ {0, ..., N − 1}, are randomly chosen in Zp−1, (c) Ci(R0) =
gR
0
i hvR0,i mod p and Ci(R
1) = gR
1
i hvR1,i mod p.
17.5 Munilla and Peinado’s Protocol (2006)
Munilla and Peinado introduced in [54, 57] the concept of void challenges as a tool to improve distance-
bounding protocols. These void challenges can also be used to decrease the mafia fraud success probability
when applied to Hancke and Kuhn’s protocol [55], which is the case analyzed in this section. Thus, for this
protocol (Algorithm 4), the challenges can be 0, 1 or void, where a void challenge means that no challenge
is sent. Void challenges are used to detect a mafia fraud using the pre-ask strategy.
Algorithm 4: Munilla and Peinado’s Protocol
Verifier Prover
(secret K) (secret K)
Pick a random NV Pick a random NP
NV−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
NP←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
H =h(K,NV , NP )
Z =H1||H2||Hn
R0=Hn+1||Hn+2|| . . . ||H2n
R1=H2n+1||H2n+2|| . . . ||H3n
H =h(K,NV , NP )
Z =H1 ||H2 || . . . ||Hn
R0=Hn+1||Hn+2|| . . . ||H2n
R1=H2n+1||H2n+2|| . . . ||H3n
If Zi = 1: Pick ci ∈R {0, 1}
and Start Timer
ci−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
If ci 6= void and Zi = 1 then
ri = R
ci
i . Elseif ci = void and
Zi = 0 then send no response.
Else abort the protocol
Stop Timer
ri←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
h(K,R0, R1)←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Check correctness of ri and
∆ti ≤ tmax for 1 ≤ i ≤ n and
verify h(K,R0, R1)
Initialization Prior to the protocol execution, the prover and the verifier agree on the security parameters
and the functions described in Table 14, and a common secret key K.
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Protocol During a first slow phase, the verifier sends to the prover a nonce NV and the prover sends to
the verifier a nonce NP (Remark 6). They both then use the pseudo-random function h and the secret key
K to generate three n-bit sequences: R0, R1 and Z. The values R0 and R1 are, as in Hancke and Kuhn’s
protocol, the responses to the challenges, while Z defines which challenges are void. In the fast phase, the
verifier sends random challenges ci when Zi = 1, and the prover instantly replies with 1-bit responses ri that
are either R0i or R
1
i , depending on the value of ci: ri = R
ci
i . If the prover receives a challenge for an interval
where Zi = 0, he assumes that the system is being attacked and aborts the protocol. Finally, the prover
sends h(K,R0, R1) in a final slow phase to confirm that no adversary has been detected.
Final Decision The verifier accepts the prover as genuine only if the final signature is correct and all the
responses ri are correct and timely: ∆ti ≤ tmax, i ∈ 1, 2, · · · , n, for some threshold tmax > 0.
Table 14: Parameters and functions (Algorithm 4)
n Number of iterations in the fast phase (it coincides with the length of vectors R0, R1 and Z)
κ Size of the secret key K (not defined in the original paper)
δ Size of random numbers NV and NP (not defined in the original paper)
tmax Threshold of the round-trip time
pf Probability of an interval being non-void (optimal value pf = 4/5, and practical value pf = 3/4)
h Hash (or pseudo-random) function whose output size is 3n
Remark 6 The paper does not specify whether the verifier or the prover sends its nonce in first.
Remark 7 During the fast phase, 2(n− nvoid) bits are exchanged, where nvoid is the number of void chal-
lenges for the protocol run. Given the average number of void challenges, namely n(1 − pf ), the average
number of exchanged bits is 2npf .
17.6 Kim, Avoine, Koeune, Standaert and Pereira’s Protocol (2008)
Kim, Avoine, Koeune, Standaert and Pereira introduced a protocol in [50] known as the Swiss-knife distance-
bounding protocol4 (Algorithm 5).
Initialization Prior to the protocol execution, the legitimate prover and the verifier agree on the security
parameters and functions described in Table 15, a system-wide constant C known to the verifier and the
prover, and a common secret key K.
Protocol During the first slow phase, the verifier chooses a nonce NV ∈R {0, 1}δ and a random binary
vector D with Hamming weight n and length σ. Intuitively, D corresponds to a mask pointing to the positions
on which the prover will be questioned during the fast phase. He transmits NV and D to the prover. The
prover chooses a nonce NP ∈R {0, 1}δ and computes a := fK(C,NP ). The prover then computes two registers
using its permanent key K as follows: Z0 := a and Z1 := a ⊕K. He finally prepares the possible answers
by extracting the relevant parts of Z0, Z1 according to the mask D, building the n-bit vectors R0 and R1.
The prover ends the slow phase transmitting NP to the verifier. During the fast phase, the verifier generates
and sends a random challenge bit ci, and the prover replies instantly with a 1-bit response that is either v
0
i
or v1i , selected by the value of ci. After n iterations, the prover computes TB := fK(c
′
1, . . . , c
′
n, ID,NV , NP )
4Like Swiss-army knives used during WWII, the Swiss-knife protocol is a multi-purpose tool. The authors claim their protocol
“resists against both mafia fraud and terrorist attacks, reaches the best known false acceptance rate, preserves privacy, resists
to channel errors, uses symmetric-key cryptography only, requires no more than 2 cryptographic operations to be performed by
the tag, can take advantage of precomputation on the tag, and offers an optional mutual authentication” [50].
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Algorithm 5: Swiss-knife Protocol
Verifier Prover
(secret K, constant C) (secret K, identifier ID,
constant C)
Pick NV ∈R {0, 1}δ Pick NP ∈R {0, 1}δ
Pick a random D s.t.
H(D) = n
a = fK(C,NP )
Z0 = a, Z1 = a⊕K
NV ,D−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
For i = 1 to n: R0i = Z
0
j and
R1i = Z
1
j , where j is the index
of the next “1” in the binary
representation of D.
NP←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−[
Pick ci ∈R {0, 1} and Start
Timer
c′i−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Stop Timer
ri←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− ri = Rc
′
i
i
TB, c
′
1, . . . , c
′
n←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− TB =
fK(c
′
1, . . . , c
′
n, ID,NV , NP )
Check ID via DB
Compute R0, R1
Compute errC :=]{i :ci 6=c′i},
errR :=]{i :ci=c′i∧ri 6=vici},
errT :=]{i :ci=c′i∧∆ti>tmax}
If errC + errR + errT ≥ T ,
then REJECT
TA = fK(NB)
TA−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ Compute and check TA
and transmits TB and the challenges c
′
1, . . . , c
′
n received during the fast phase. The verifier performs a search
over its database until he finds a pair (ID,K) and computes R0, R1. If mutual authentication is expected,
the verifier computes TA := fK(NP ), sends it to the prover who checks its correctness.
Final Decision The authentication succeeds if and only if errC + errR + errT < T .
Table 15: Parameters and functions (Algorithm 5)
n Number of iterations in the fast phase
σ Size of the output of f and consequently size of the secret key K
δ Size of nonces NV and NP
tmax Threshold of the round-trip time
T Threshold of tolerable errors
f Pseudo-random function whose output size is σ
17.7 Avoine and Tchamkerten’s Protocol (2009)
The protocol (Algorithm 6) introduced by Avoine and Tchamkerten in [7] is a generalization of Hancke and
Kuhn’s protocol that is more secure in terms of mafia and distance fraud.
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Algorithm 6: Tree-based Protocol
Verifier Prover
(secret K) (secret K)
Pick NV ∈R {0, 1}δ Pick NP ∈R {0, 1}δ
Compute hK(NV , NP ) Compute hK(NV , NP )
NV−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
NP , [hK (NV ,NP )]
c
1←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Labelization of the ` trees Labelization of the ` trees[
Pick ci ∈ {0, 1}
Start Timer
ci−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Stop Timer
ri←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− ri
Check correctness of ri’s and
if ∆i ≤ tmax for 1 ≤ i ≤ n
Initialization Prior to the protocol execution, the legitimate prover and the verifier agree on the security
parameters and functions described in Table 16, in addition to a common secret key K.
Protocol It consists of a slow authentication phase followed by a fast proximity check phase. Both phases
have their own security parameters: the credential size c for the authentication and the number of bit
exchanges n between the prover and the verifier during the fast phase.
Authentication The verifier sends a nonce NV to the prover, in the form of a uniformly random bit-string
of size δ. The prover then generates a δ-bit nonce NP and, based on NV and NP , computes a keyed-hash
value hK(NV , NP ) whose output is a string of at least c + ` · (2d+1 − 2) bits where d, ` ≥ 1 are such that
d·` = n. The prover sends to the verifier both NP and the first c bits of hK(NV , NP ) denoted [hK(NV , NP )]c1.
Proximity Check Using the subsequent q = ` · (2d+1 − 2) bits of the hash value hK(NV , NP ), denoted
by [hK(NV , NP )]
c+q
c+1, the prover and the verifier label ` full binary trees of depth d as follows (see Figure 2
for an example). The left and the right edges of each tree are labeled 0 and 1 respectively, and each node of
each tree, except the root, is associated with the value of a particular bit in [hK(NV , NP )]
c+q
c+1 in a one-to-one
fashion.5 This labeling is possible since each tree has 2d+1 − 2 nodes (excluding the root), which gives a
total of ` · (2d+1 − 2) nodes to be labeled.
An n-round fast bit exchange between the verifier and the prover proceeds using the trees: the edge
and the node values represent the verifier’s challenges and the prover’s replies, respectively. At each step
i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} the verifier generates a challenge in the form of a randomly uniform bit ci and sends it to
the prover. Now let j ≥ 1 be such that (j − 1)(2d+1 − 2) + 1 ≤ i ≤ j(2d+1 − 2). Upon receiving ci, the
prover replies ri, which corresponds to the value of the node in the j-th tree whose edge path from the root
is given by c(j−1)(2d+1−2)+1, c(j−1)(2d+1−2)+2, . . . , ci. The example illustrated by Figure 2 uses the following
parameters: n = 6, ` = 2, and d = 3. The sequence of challenges is (1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0), which corresponds to
the two thick edge paths in the trees starting with the tree on the left. The corresponding sequence of
replies is (1, 1, 1, 0, 1, 0). Note that each reply ri is a function of at most d previous cj ’s. Finally, for all
i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, the verifier measures the time interval ∆ti between the instant ci is sent until the instant
ri is received.
5To do this, one sequentially assigns the bit values of [hK(NV , NP )]
c+q
c+1 to all the nodes of each tree, starting with the lowest
level nodes, moving left to right, and moving up after assigning the nodes of the current level.
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Final Decision The verifier accepts the prover’s identity only if the c authentication bits are correct and
if the n replies of the fast phase are correct while meeting the time constraint ∆ti ≤ tmax, i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n},
for some threshold tmax > 0.
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Figure 2: Two decision trees of depth 3, i.e., ` = 2, d = 3
Remark 8 The case n = d · ` is the maximum situation where all d replies of the `-th tree are used. We
impose this constraint only to have somewhat simpler performance expressions. It is easy to see that this
constraint can be replaced by d · ` ≥ n, which is the situation where the last tree is only partly used.
Remark 9 When d = 1 and ` = n, the fast phase of the protocol reduces to the HK Protocol.
Table 16: Parameters and functions (Algorithm 6)
n Number of iterations in the fast phase
κ Size of secret key
δ Size of nonces NV and NP
c Credential size
d Depth of each tree
` Number of trees (d and ` satisfy d · ` = n)
tmax Threshold of the round-trip time
hK Keyed-hash function whose output size is a bit string of size at least c+ ` · (2d+1 − 2)
17.8 Rasmussen and Cˇapkun’s Protocol (2010)
The protocol (Algorithm 7) was introduced by Rasmussen and Cˇapkun and originally appeared in [61]. In
this paper we consider the updated version that appeared in [62].
Initialization Prior to the protocol execution, the legitimate prover and the verifier agree on the security
parameters, the functions described in Table 17, and a common secret key K.
Protocol The prover starts the protocol by picking a fresh (large) nonce NP . The prover then commits
(using for example a hash) on NP and its identity. This commitment is not keyed. The prover now activates
its distance-bounding hardware and set the output channel according to the opposite of the first bit of the
nonce NP . From this moment on, any signal that the prover receives on channel C0 will be reflected on the
output channel that is set. However, the prover does not start switching between output channels yet.
Upon receiving the commitment, the verifier picks a fresh (large) nonce NV and prepares to initiate the
distance-bounding phase, in which it will measure the distance bound to the prover. The verifier starts a
high precision clock to measure the (round trip) time-of-flight of the signal, ∆t, and begins to transmit his
nonce NV on channel C0. From this point on, the verifier also listens on the two reply channels C1 and C2
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Algorithm 7: RC Protocol
Verifier Prover
Commit(NP , IDP )←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− Pick a random NP
Pick a random NV[
Start Timer
NV−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Stop Timer
CRCS(NV ,NP )←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
From channels extract N ′P Measure delay n
From signal extract N ′V
From signal extract delay n′
Sign(M)←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− M = Commit(NP , IDP )||
n||IDV ||NP ||NV
Verify {∆t, n = n′,
N ′V = NV , N
′
P = NP ,
Sign(M)}
and keeps listening on the two channels until he either receives the expected response from the prover or
until he detects an error and aborts the protocol.
As soon as the prover receives (and, in parallel demodulates) the first bit of NV on C0, he starts switching
reply channels according to the bits of his nonce NP . When the first few bits are being demodulated, the
prover is still reflecting the input (challenge) bits and the switching of the channels is not started yet (i.e.,
the prover does not start sending back NP yet). This function, used by the prover to form its reply to the
verifier, is called “Challenge Reflection with Channel Selection” (CRCS). The demodulation of the bits is
not done within the distance-bounding hardware (called the distance-bounding extension), but is done in the
prover’s regular radio. A possible implementation of the distance-bounding extension (i.e., of CRCS) using
analog mixers is described in [62]. It is not important how long it takes for the prover’s radio to demodulate
the first bits since the prover does not need to begin to switch the output channels within any predefined
time as long as the prover keeps track of the delay n. The delay represents the time taken by the prover to
react to the incoming signal, i.e., to switch its circuit to transmit the first bit of its answer. The switching
starts within the duration of NV , and allows the transmission of NP . The first part of NV could even be
known and constitute a public and fixed-length preamble, upon the detection of which the prover would
start switching the channels (i.e., would start sending NP ).
When the prover starts sending NP , he sends the bits of NP with a fixed frequency (e.g., every 100ms)
by switching channels depending on the value of the current bit. In each interval, the prover reflects back
several bits of NV and a single bit of NP . The bit of NP is encoded in the choice of the reply channel. The
prover also receives in parallel the verifier’s challenge nonce (i.e., NV ) on channel C0 using his regular radio.
When the verifier has sent all the bits of his nonce, he waits for the prover to complete the reflection
of the signal and then both the prover and verifier disable their distance-bounding extensions. The verifier
can then use an auto-correlation detector like the ones used in GPS receivers to determine the exact time
of flight, ∆t, of the reflected signal. This can also be done during the distance-bounding phase, i.e., in
parallel to the analog distance-bounding circuit. Finally, the prover sends a signed message compounded by
the commitment sent during the first slow phase, the delay n, his nonce NP , and the verifier’s identity and
nonce.
Final Decision The verifier accepts the prover’s identity only if the bits of NP were sent within the same
time duration, these bits match with those he received in the final message of the prover, the reflection of
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NV through the channel switch was correct, the signature in the final message is correct, the delay n
′ he
computed match with the prover’s one n (including in the final message), and finally that the round-trip
time is below the time threshold tmax.
Table 17: Parameters and functions (Algorithm 7)
δV Size of the verifier’s challenge nonce NV
δP Size of the prover’s nonce NP
σ Lower bound for the size of the commitment and the signature
tmax Threshold of the round trip time
Commit Secure commitment function that outputs σ bits.
Sign Signature function whose output size is σ
17.9 Trujillo-Rasua, Martin and Avoine’s Protocol (2010)
Poulidor, the graph-based distance-bounding protocol (Algorithm 8) designed by Trujillo-Rasua, Martin,
and Avoine [69], uses specific node and edge dependencies in the tree of the AT protocol [7] – which then
can alternatively be represented by an acyclic graph. Poulidor benefits from a lower memory requirement
compared to the AT protocol. Security is also reduced.
Algorithm 8: Poulidor Protocol
Verifier Prover
(secret K) (secret K)
Pick a random NV ∈R {0, 1}δ Pick a random NP ∈R {0, 1}δ
NV−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
NP←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
H1 . . . H4n = h(K,NP , NV )
Fill the graph:
for i = 0 to 2n− 1:{
`i = Hi+2n+1 ⊕ 1
si = Hi+2n+1
qi = Hi+1
H1 . . . H4n = h(K,NP , NV )
Fill the graph:
for i = 0 to 2n− 1:{
`i = Hi+2n+1 ⊕ 1
si = Hi+2n+1
qi = Hi+1
Pick ci ∈R {0, 1}
Start Timer
ci−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Move from qpi to qpi+1
Stop Timer
ri←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− ri = qpi+1
Move from qvi to qvi+1
if ri 6= qvi+1 then abort the
protocol
Check that ∆ti≤ tmax
(1 ≤ i ≤ n)
Initialization Prior the protocol execution, the legitimate prover and the verifier agree on the security
parameters and functions described in Table 18, and a common secret K.
Protocol During the slow-phase, both the verifier and the prover build a directed graph G. The proposed
graph requires 2n nodes {q0, q1, . . . , q2n−1}, and 4n edges {s0, s1, · · · , s2n−1, `0, `1, · · · , `2n−1} such that, si
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Table 18: Parameters and functions (Algorithm 8)
n Number of iterations in the fast phase
κ Size of the secret key K
δP and δV Size of nonces NP and NV respectively
tmax Threshold of the round-trip time
H Hash function whose output size is 2n
q0
q4
q2q6
q1
q3
q7
q5
`0
s0
s1
`1
`2
s2
s3
`3
`4
s4
s5
`5
`6
s6
s7
`7
Figure 3: Graph when n = 4
(0 ≤ i ≤ 2n−1) is an edge from qi to q(i+1) mod 2n, and `i (0 ≤ i ≤ 2n−1) is an edge from qi to q(i+2) mod 2n.
Figure 3 depicts the graph when n = 4.
In order to build G, the verifier sends a nonce NV to the prover, and the latter sends a nonce NP to the
verifier. From these values, and the secret K, they compute H = h(K,NP , NV ) and set up a graph G as
follows: the first 2n bits are used to value the nodes while the remaining bits are used to value the edges
si (0 ≤ i ≤ 2n − 1), and finally `i = si ⊕ 1 (0 ≤ i ≤ 2n − 1). After agreeing on the graph, the fast phase
begins. This phase consists of n stateful rounds numbered from 0 to n− 1. Initially qp0 = qv0 = q0, but in
the i-th round P ’s state and V ’s state are represented by the nodes qpi and qvi respectively. Upon reception
of the i-th challenge ci, P moves from the node qpi to qpi+1 in the following way: qpi+1 = q(pi+1) mod 2n if
si is labeled with ci, otherwise qpi+1 = q(pi+2) mod 2n. Finally, the prover sends as response ri the bit-value
of the node qpi+1 . Upon reception of the prover’s answer ri, the verifier stops his timer, and computes ∆ti,
i.e., the round trip time spent for this exchange. Besides this, V moves to the node qvi+1 using the challenge
ci (as the prover did but from the node qvi) and checks if qvi+1 = ri.
Final Decision The verifier accepts the prover’s identity only if n responses of the fast phase are correct
and the time constraint ∆ti ≤ tmax, i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, for some threshold tmax > 0.
17.10 Kim and Avoine’s Protocol (KA2) (2011)
Kim and Avoine introduced in 2009 a distance-bounding protocol with mixed challenges [48], namely chal-
lenges known and challenges unknown in advance by the prover. Challenges known in advance allow the
prover to help the verifier to detect an attack, but these challenges also allow the prover to perform a distance
fraud. Kim and Avoine improved their protocol in 2011, yielding a new variant known as KA2 [49], which
is analyzed in this section (Algorithm 9).
Initialization Prior to the protocol execution, the legitimate prover and the verifier agree on the security
parameters and functions described in Table 19, along with a common secret key K.
Protocol The verifier sends the prover a nonce NV and the prover sends the verifier a nonce NP . They
then use the pseudo-random function h and the secret key K to generate a 2n-bit sequence D||R0||R1.
During the first α rounds, the verifier sends predefined 1-bit challenges ci. In every round, the prover
sends a 1-bit response that is R0i if ci = Di. Otherwise, he sends random answers until the end of the fast
phase.
During the remaining n − α rounds, the verifier sends random 1-bit challenges ci. In every round, the
prover sends a 1-bit response that is Rcii , or he sends random answers until the end of the fast phase if a
problem (ci 6= Di) was detected during the first α rounds.
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Algorithm 9: KA2 Protocol
Verifier Prover
(secret K) (secret K)
Pick NV ∈R {0, 1}δ Pick NP ∈R {0, 1}δ
NV−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
NP←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
H = h(K,NV , NP )
R0 = H1||H2|| . . . ||Hn
R1 = Hn+1||Hn+2|| . . . ||H2n−α
D = H2n−α+1||H2n−α+2|| . . . ||H2n
H = h(K,NV , NP )
R0 = H1||H2|| . . . ||Hn
R1 = Hn+1||Hn+2|| . . . ||H2n−α
D=H2n−α+1||H2n−α+2||. . .||H2n
For i = 1 to α, Assign ci = Di
Start Timer
ci−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Stop Timer
ri←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− ri ={
R0i , if ci = Di
Rnd if ci 6=Di(err. detected)
After error detection, only
send random answers until the
end of the protocol. For i = α+ 1 to n, Pickci ∈ {0, 1}
Start Timer
ci−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Stop Timer
ri←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− ri = Rcii
Check correctness of ri’s
and ∆ti ≤ tmax for 1 ≤ i ≤ n
Final Decision The verifier accepts the prover’s identity only if n responses of the fast phase are correct,
while also meeting the time constraint ∆ti ≤ tmax, i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, for a threshold tmax > 0.
Table 19: Parameters and functions (Algorithm 9)
n Number of iterations in the fast phase
κ Size of the secret key K
δ Size of nonces NV and NP
tmax Threshold of the round-trip time
α Number of predefined rounds
h Pseudo-random function whose output size is 2n
17.11 Yum, Kim, Hong and Lee’s Protocol (2010)
Yum, Kim, Hon and Lee created a distance-bounding protocol with mutual authentication [76].
Initialization Prior to the protocol execution the users A and B agree on the security parameters and
functions described in Table 20, in addition to a common secret key K.
Protocol The protocol consists of a slow phase where two nonces (NA and NB) are exchanged, and a
fast phase where challenge bits ci and response bits ri are exchanged. In the slow phase, the users compute
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Algorithm 10: YKHL Protocol
User A User B
(secret K) (secret K)
Pick NA ∈R {0, 1}δ Pick NB ∈R {0, 1}δ
NA−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
NB←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
H = h(K,NA, NB)
D = H1 ||H2 || . . . ||Hn
R0 = Hn+1||Hn+2|| . . . ||H2n
R1 = H2n+1||H2n+2|| . . . ||H3n
H = h(K,NA, NB)
D = H1 ||H2 || . . . ||Hn
R0 = Hn+1||Hn+2|| . . . ||H2n
R1 = H2n+1||H2n+2|| . . . ||H3n
Case I: Di = 0 Pick ci ∈ {0, 1}
Start Timer
ci−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Stop Timer
ri←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− ri =
{
R0i , if ci = 0
R1i , if ci = 1
If ri 6= Rcii or a collision is
detected,
If a collision is detected B
enters into the protection
mode.
If ri 6= Rcii or a collision is
detected,
Case II: Di = 1 Pick ci ∈ {0, 1}
ci←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− Start Timer
ri =
{
R0i , if ci = 0
R1i , if ci = 1
ri−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ Stop Timer
If a collision is detected, A
enters into the protection
mode.
If ri 6= Rcii or a collision is
detected, B enters into the
protection mode.
Check correctness of ri’s and Check correctness of ri’s and
∆ti ≤ tmax for Case I ∆ti ≤ tmax for Case II
three n-bit sequences, D,R0, and R1 using a pseudo-random function applied to NA and NB . In the i-th
round of the fast phase, each user acts as a prover or a verifier according to the “direction bit” Di. When
Di = 0, A sends a random challenge bit ci and B answers with Ri
ci , i.e., the i-th bit of the register Rci .
When Di = 1, B sends a challenge and A responds. If the received response bit is incorrect, the recipient
moves to a “protection mode”: he sends random bits for all subsequent rounds. Each user also checks that
no collision occurred in the round, that is, the two users did not talk or remain silent simultaneously.
Final Decision A accepts B as legitimate only if the responses of the fast phase are correct and meet the
time constraint ∆ti ≤ tmax for Case I, for some threshold tmax > 0. So does B for Case II.
Table 20: Parameters and functions (Algorithm 10)
n Number of iterations in the fast phase
κ Size of the secret key K
δ Size of nonces NA and NB
tmax Threshold of the round-trip time
h Pseudo-random function whose output size is 3n
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17.12 SKI Protocols (2013)
In [16, 15, 14], the authors introduced a series of protocols called SKI. These protocols (presented in Algo-
rithm 11) are described as follows.
Algorithm 11: The SKI Protocols
Verifier Prover
(secret K) (secret K)
NP←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− Pick NP ∈R {0, 1}δ
Pick a ∈R Ft
′n
q , L ∈ L, and
NV ∈R {0, 1}δ
M, L, NV−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
M = a+ fK(NP , NV , L) a = M − fK(NP , NV , L),
K′ = L(K)
Pick ci ∈R {1, . . . , t}
Start Timer
ci−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ {
ri=F (ci, ai, K
′
i) if ci∈{1,. . ., t}
Halt otherwise
Stop timer
ri←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Check the correctness of ris
and ∆ti ≤ tmax for at least
n− x rounds i ∈ {1, . . . , t}
OutV−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Initialization Prior to the protocol execution, the legitimate prover and the verifier agree on the security
parameters and functions described in Table 21, and a common secret K.
Table 21: Parameters and functions (Algorithm 11)
n Number of iterations in the fast phase
t Size of the challenges domain
t′ Security parameter
q Power of a prime number
κ Size of the secret key K
δ Size of the nonces NP and NV
tmax Threshold of the round-trip time
f Pseudo random function whose output size is t′n elements of Fq
x Maximum number of incorrect rounds
Protocol During the slow phase, the prover first generates a nonce NP , and sends it to the verifier. The
verifier then generates its nonce NV along with a = (a1, . . . , at′) (ai ∈ Fnq where Fq is the finite fields of
order q and the authors of [14] employ in concrete examples q = 2) and a mapping L ∈ L, where L is defined
below. Using its nonce and the prover’s nonce, he computes fK(NP , NV , L) and XORs it with a, in order
to obtain the mask M . Finally, the verifier sends NV , L, and M to the prover. Using these two values and
its nonce, the prover computes a and K ′ = L(K).
Then the n-round fast phase begins. In each round, the verifier picks a challenge ci ∈ {1, . . . , t} at
random. Then, he starts a timer and sends ci to the prover. Upon reception of the challenge, the prover first
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checks whether ci belongs to {1, . . . , t}. If ci /∈ {1, . . . , t} the protocol stops. If ci ∈ {1, . . . , t}, the prover
computes its answer, ri = F (ci, ai,K
′
i), where the function F is presented in more details below. The prover
then sends its answer back to the verifier. Once the verifier received ri, he stops its timer and stores ∆ti,
the round trip time of the round i, as well as ri.
As discussed below, the SKI protocol is specified with another set L = Lbit containing all functions Lµ,
for µ ∈ Fκq defined by Lµ(K) = (µ ·K, . . . , µ ·K) i.e., Lµ(K) is the n-bit vector in which all bits are set to
the dot product of µ and K.
Final Decision The protocol succeeds if there are at least n − x rounds i for which ri is correct and
∆ti ≤ tmax. The verifier then outputs a message OutV , denoting the success or failure of the protocol.
Remark 10 With respect to the mapping in L introduced along with SKI, note that usual distance-bounding
protocols would employ L = Lclassic i.e., the set containing a single function L which is the identity function.
Thus, in those case, L(K) = K (imposing further that κ = n). The value of x also introduced along with SKI
is used to tolerate some level of noise in the time-critical exchanges. However, introducing this tolerance
brings a new type of terrorist fraud, as it will be discussed in Section 18.5. The purpose of L = Lbit is
precisely to defeat this attack. But, to compare with other protocols, our analyses below assume x = 0 and
L = Lclassic.
Remark 11 The function F is essential for the SKI protocols. Using a different function leads to different
protocol security achievements. Specifically, the authors mainly refer to the efficient cases of q = 2, t′ = 2,
and F (1, ai,K
′
i) = (ai)1, F (2, ai,K
′
i) = (ai)2, and F (3, ai,K
′
i) = K
′
i + (ai)1 + (ai)2, where K
′
i ∈ GF (2),
(ai)j ∈ GF (2), j = 1, 2. Generally speaking, this response function, denoted Fxor, can be given as follows:
Fxor(ci, ai,K
′
i) = K
′
i1ci=t+(ai)11ci∈{t,1}+ . . .+(ai)t−11ci∈{t,t−1}, where ci ∈ {1, . . . , t}, K ′i ∈ GF (q), q ≥ 2,
(ai)j ∈ GF (q), j ∈ {1, . . . , t− 1}, and 1R is 1 if R is true and 0 otherwise.
The authors actually consider two variants SKIpro with t = 3 and SKIlite with t = 2, namely SKIlite
never uses the ci = 3 challenge. Other cases (treated separately) are summarized as follows:
 SKI4: defined by the response-function Fxor above, with q = 2, t = 4, t
′ = 3, i.e., F (ci, ai, xi) = (ai)ci
for ci ∈ {1, 2, 3} and F (4, ai,K ′i) = K ′i + (ai)1 + (ai)2 + (ai)3, with (ai)1, (ai)2, (ai)3,K ′i ∈ GF (2);
 SKIshamir: defined by a variant of response-function based on the Shamir secret sharing, with q = 4,
t = 3, t′ = 2, i.e., F (ci, ai,K ′i) = K
′
i + (ai)1c¯i + (ai)2c¯
2
i for c¯i ∈ GF (4)∗, with (ai)1, (ai)2 ∈ GF (4).
Here, c 7→ c¯ denotes a one-to-one mapping from {1, 2, 3} to GF (4)∗.
While SKIpro can be presented as a variant of the TDB protocol proposed in [5] and SKIlite is very similar to
the Hancke and Kuhn protocol [42], other variants of F can be suggested, yielding different SKI protocols.
These functions have to respect the requirements provided in [14]. These are informally summarized in
Remark 12.
Remark 12 (Requirements for the function F and the set L; (see [14] for details)) The F func-
tion must comply to the following conditions, in order to ensure security, as stated in Section 1.6.
1. For any ci, F (ci, ·, ·) must be GF (q)-linear and non-degenerate in the ai part.
2. For any two values ci and c
′
i of the i-th challenge and for any ai, F (ci, ai,K
′
i) and F (c
′
i, ai,K
′
i) give
no information about K ′i.
3. For any ai, one can compute K
′
i from the table of the map ci 7→ F (ci, ai,K ′i).
4. For any K ′i, the largest preimage of ci 7→ F (ci, ai,K ′i) must be small, on average over ai.
The third requirement above is used for resistance to terrorist fraud. Note that SKIlite does not satisfy it, so it
does not resist to terrorist fraud. The requirement on L is that given a source generating some (L,L(K) + e)
for L ∈ L uniformly distributed and e of “small” Hamming weight, and arbitrary distribution, then K can
be reconstructed.
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18 Supplementary materials: Appendix B
This section presents generic improvements that can be applied on distance-bounding protocols.
18.1 MUltiState Enhancement: MUSE
Although location-based authentication services that measure the round trip time of entire data packets have
been proposed [75], most of the distance-bounding protocols are based on the measurement of the round
trip time of 1-bit messages. Munilla and Peinado [54, 55] initiated a new family of protocols that use an
additional third state during the fast phase. Although binary data are still exchanged during that phase,
Munilla and Peinado suggest to use void challenges. These void challenges, which means that no challenge
is sent, are used to authenticate the verifier, reducing thus the success probability of a pre-ask strategy.
MUSE is a generalization of this idea proposed by Avoine, Floerkemeier, and Martin [3], where the
number of possible states used during the fast phase can be still larger: the authors indeed extend the
concept of void challenges to p-symbols where p ≥ 2. Using p-symbols is a generic technique that reduces
the number of rounds during the fast phase. Algorithm 12 describes MUSE-3 HK, which is the 3-symbol
variant of HK. In MUSE-3 HK, H = h(K,NV , NP ) is used to fill up three registers R
j (j = 0, 1, 2) that each
contains n 3-symbols {Sjn+1, ..., Sjn+n}. When considering the mafia fraud against MUSE-3 HK, the success
probability is PrMF|pre =
(
5
9
)n
, which is better than the 3-symbol protocol of Munilla and Peinado [54, 55].
Note that to be able to easily generate and store p-symbols (p > 2) on prover side the authors suggested to
encode challenges and responses on dlog2(p)e bits.
Algorithm 12: Hancke and Kuhn’s Protocol with MUSE-3
Verifier Prover
(secret K) (secret K)
Pick NV ∈R {0, 1}δ Pick NP ∈R {0, 1}δ
NV−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
NP←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
H = h(K,NV , NP )
R0 = S1 ||S2 || . . . ||Sn
R1 = Sn+1||Sn+2|| . . . ||S2n
R2 = S2n+1||S2n+2|| . . . ||S3n
H = h(K,NV , NP )
R0 = S1 ||S2 || . . . ||Sn
R1 = Sn+1||Sn+2|| . . . ||S2n
R2 = S2n+1||S2n+2|| . . . ||S3n[
Pick ci∈R {0, 1, 2}, Start Timer
ci−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Stop Timer
ri←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− ri = Rcii
Check correctness of ri’s and
∆ti ≤ tmax for 1 ≤ i ≤ n
18.2 PUF-based protocols
Kardas¸, Kiraz, Bingo¨l, and Demirci introduce in [46] two novel distance-bounding protocols based on Phys-
ically Unclonable Functions (PUFs). A PUF is defined as an unclonable function embedded in a physical
structure that is easy to implement but practically impossible to duplicate, even given the exact manufactur-
ing process definitions. The output of the function is obtained as a result of inherent physical properties such
as delays of gates and wires in a circuit, variations in the temperature and supply voltage. The unclonability
of the function is guaranteed by these physical processes, and some mechanisms (e.g., Fuzzy Extractors)
are used to ensure the determinism. Since PUFs behave as a random function (if one assumes that all the
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physical properties cannot be predicted), without having the actual PUF circuit it is hard to predict the
outputs as given the inputs. Moreover, their intrinsic structure yields resistance against tampering since
physically tampering will most likely change its physical structure.
The authors define a strong adversary model in which the adversary has access to volatile memory of the
prover, namely an RFID tag. PUF functions are used to prevent an adversary from obtaining the long-term
secrets and clone the tags. The main idea is that long-term secrets are not stored in the memory of the
prover but they are reconstructed from pre-secrets using a PUF circuit during each protocol execution.
The first protocol proposed by Kardas¸ et al. is described in Algorithm 13. They use two different
long-term keys K and L which are consecutively generated as outputs of the PUF function. Note that K
and L never appear in the volatile memory at the same time. First, K is constructed by using PUF, and
then completely deleted from the memory after being used as a key of PRF function. Then similarly, L is
generated and deleted after generation of registers. Hence, whenever an adversary tampers the tag she can
only obtain one of the keys, under the assumption that the structure of the PUF circuit has been destroyed
after the attack thus PUF cannot be re-evaluated anymore. The authors state that since the adversary
cannot retrieve all the long-term keys, she can only perform the attack in black-box model.
Given that the success probability of mafia and terrorist frauds remains high, namely (3/4)n, the authors
introduce an extended protocol with a final signature that reaches (1/2)n against these frauds.
Algorithm 13: Kardas¸ et al.’s protocol based on PUF without final signature
Verifier Prover
(secret K,L) (pre-secret G1, G2)
Pick NV ∈R {0, 1}δ Pick NP ∈R {0, 1}δ
NV−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
K = PUF (G1)
T = fK(NP , NV )
Delete K
L = PUF (G2)
v,R0, R1 = fL(T )
|v| = |R0| = |R1| = n
Delete L
NP , v←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
v′, R0
′
, R1
′
= fL(fK(NP , NV ))
If v′ 6= v then abort[
Pick ci∈{0, 1}, Start Timer
ci−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
ri = R
ci
i
Stop Timer
ri←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Check correctness of ri’s and
∆ti ≤ tmax for 1 ≤ i ≤ n
18.3 Threshold Distance-Bounding Protocol to Defeat Terrorist Fraud
Many distance-bounding protocols are subject to terrorist fraud as the long-term key cannot be retrieved
in practice from the information needed to successfully pass the protocol. Avoine, Lauradoux, and Martin
in [5] suggest that a secret-sharing scheme, possibly based on threshold cryptography can be used to thwart
terrorist fraud. In their proposal, the authentication material consists of p shares of a (p, k) threshold scheme:
if the prover reveals any combination of k shares to the adversary, the long-term secret leaks. By contrast,
gathering strictly less than k shares reveals no information about the secret.
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To illustrate this, the authors describe a variant of HK, which they call TDB (Threshold Distance-
Bounding), where the responses to the challenges are generated using a threshold scheme. This protocol
differs from HK in the way the registers are generated during the slow phase: after the nonce exchange,
verifier and prover use their shared secret K to compute a p× n matrix R over a group G. The matrix R is
used to respond to the challenges as follows. The verifier requires the prover during the i-th round the value
rci,i in R (ci-th row and i-th column). The challenges consequently consist of dlog2 pe bits and the responses
of dlog2 |G|e bits. The calculation of R is such that the knowledge of any combination of k elements of a
given column reveals a coordinate of the key.
R =
 r1,1 . . . r1,n... . . . ...
rp,1 . . . rp,n

The authors introduce in [5] three classes of adversaries: i.) BD-ADV or blind-adversary, who does not learn
whether the protocol succeeds, ii.) RE-ADV or result-adversary, who can observe if the protocol succeeds and,
iii.) RD-ADV or round-adversary, who has the capability of observing the result of each round. They then
analyze the resistance of their approach when facing each of these adversaries, according to the parameters
p and k. The parameter p is actually critical regarding mafia fraud, while k impacts the probability of a
successful terrorist fraud.
For BD-ADV, the maximum number of elements of a column ofR which can be safely given to the adversary
is k−1. As a result, and for this adversary, TDB implemented with (p, 2) threshold scheme is secure against
terrorist fraud (this probability coincides with that for the mafia fraud) for any p ≥ 2.
When the other adversaries are considered, the post-ask strategy must be analyzed. These adversaries
can learn two elements of each column of R for each protocol round, modifying all the challenges ci received
from the verifier and sending the modified versions ĉi to the prover; i.e., ∀i ĉi 6= ci. If a round succeeds, then
r̂ci = rci . The RD-ADV can do this on all rounds in parallel, while RE-ADV is limited to a single round per
attack. So, TDB should be used with k ≥ 3 if we want to protect the key against those stronger adversaries.
On the other hand, the prover should give to the adversary at most k−2 shares at each round (and not k−1
as when BD-ADV was analyzed). Thus, in the context of RE-ADV and RD-ADV, to be secure against terrorist
fraud attack, schemes (p, 3) for any p ≥ 3 should be used.
The authors also describe a variant, called TTDB, that reduces the number of systems of shares computed.
Whereas a column of R is used only once in TDB, the same column is used q times in TTDB. TTDB actually
differs from TDB on three points: i.) The size of prover’s answers; TTDB works on vectors of q coordinates
in G, and therefore the responses of the prover are elements in Gq. ii.) The matrix computation; each
distinct column is repeated q times in the matrix. The overall number of rounds is kept constant n, and
consequently there are only n/q distinct columns in R. The resulting p× n matrix R over Gq is defined by:
q times q times︷ ︸︸ ︷
r1,1...r1,1 . . .
︷ ︸︸ ︷
r1,n/q...r1,n/q
...
. . .
...
rp,1...rp,1 . . . rp,n/q...rp,n/q

Finally: iii.) when working on a given distinct column of R, the challenges ci are not allowed to be repeated.
The results show that TTDB is a generalization of TDB for the terrorist fraud. For BD-ADV, TTDB is
secure when q = k − 1. Stronger adversaries, with the post-ask strategy, can recover at most 2q shares for
round. Therefore (p, 2q + 1) threshold schemes should be used, and the prover, when colluding with the
adversary, should only reveal q shares. For these values, TTDB is also secure against terrorist fraud.
18.4 Previous-Challenge Dependent Protocols
Previous-challenge dependent distance-bounding protocols are analyzed by Kara, Kardas¸, Bingo¨l, and Avoine
in [45]. They focus on the low-cost distance-bounding protocols having bitwise fast phases and no final
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signature. As for the classification, they introduce the notion of k-previous challenge dependent (k-PCD)
protocols where each response bit depends on the current and the k previous challenges. First, the authors
analyze the case k = 0, that is when each response bit depends on the current challenge only, and the case
k = 1. They show that the latter provides a better security than the former one and propose a natural
extension to transform 0-PCD protocols into 1-PCD protocols. This modification consists in a simple
polynomial arithmetic operation to compute the responses.
The authors show that mafia fraud and distance fraud are correlated by providing trade-off curves between
the security levels of these two attacks. They give the theoretical security bounds for two classes: 0-PCD
and 1-PCD. The authors thus claim that protocols can be designed to enforce the mafia or distance fraud
resistance, but not both at the same time, without increasing the memory needs. For k = 0 they find that
PrMF(R) + PrDF(R) ≥ 3/2, where PrMF(R) and PrDF(R) are the maximum probabilities for an adversary
of correctly guessing one bit response for mafia fraud and distance fraud respectively. As a consequence of
this result, one can conclude that protocols with k = 0 cannot attain the ideal security against distance
fraud, i.e., PrDF(R) = 1/2, without being totally vulnerable against mafia fraud; and also that the security
of mafia fraud cannot be better than 3/4.
The optimal security limit for mafia fraud and the trade-off curve for protocols with k = 1 turn out to be
PrMF(R) ≥ 5/8 and PrMF(R) + PrDF(R) ≥ 5/4 respectively, and therefore it lies below that the previous
one for k = 0. Thus, the ideal security level against distance fraud can be reached with PrMF(R) ≥ 3/4.
Finally, the authors apply the natural extension to HK for improving distance fraud resistance in one
case, and for improving mafia fraud resistance in the other case6.
The authors leave as an open question to construct trade-off curves for k ≥ 2, but they conjecture that
the security should be enhanced when k is increased.
18.5 Distance-bounding over noisy channels
Distance-bounding protocols are conducted over noisy wireless ad hoc channels. The fast phase consists, for
the most part, of single bits sent between the prover and the verifier. Due to the unreliability of the channel,
the communicating parties might receive erroneous bits during this phase. Being robust to relatively high
bit-error rates is a desirable property for a distance-bounding protocol.
There are two main approaches in the literature to make distance-bounding protocols noise-resilient, both
requiring to increase the number of rounds during the fast phase.
The first and easiest approach to deal with noise is to allow up to x incorrect responses during the
fast phase: the distance-bounding protocol succeeds if at least (n− x) bit-responses sent by the prover are
correct. This technique can be easily applied when the correctness of each of the n responses can be verified
independently, which is the case for most distance-bounding protocols.
The second approach consists of using an error correcting code. It can be applied on many protocols
but it is particularly useful in protocols where one single bit error does not allow the verifier to check the
correctness of the other rounds (e.g., in BC protocol). The idea is to apply an (n, k) error correcting code
on a bitstring of length k, which is used by the prover to compute the responses in the fast phase (e.g., to
compute a XOR of the i-th bit of this bitstring and the challenge). The error correcting code is constructed
in such a way that it can correct at least x bit errors. By applying this code to the bitstring, its length
increases to n bits. These n bits are then used in the fast bit exchange phase. After this phase, the verifier
applies the error correcting code to compute and verify the original bitstring of k bits. Note that only the
parameter k has an influence on the security, in contrast to n.
Note that most distance-bounding protocols can be easily made noise-resilient by applying one of the
two approaches. The second approach can be used by BC and MAD protocols, while the first approach can
be easily applied on most other distance-bounding protocols. However, it seems harder to make DBPK-Log,
Tree-based, Poulidor, and RC protocols noise-resilient.
6Note that there is a typo in [45], where it should be yici ⊕ yi−1ci−1 instead of yici ⊕ yici−1 .
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When implementing a noise-resilient distance-bounding protocol, it is of the utmost importance to ac-
curately estimate the bit error rate expected during the fast phase. If the estimation on the number x of
expected bit errors is lower than the actual bit error rate then the false rejection ratio is significant, meaning
that some honest provers are not accepted by the verifier. However, a high x affects the security level of
the protocol in a negative way: an attacker can guess some responses wrongly, and blame it on the noise.
Consequently, when analyzing the security properties of a noise-resilient distance-bounding protocol, it is
typically assumed that no noise is present during the fast phase, but the verifier allows up to x bit errors.
This is the worst case scenario. The success probability of an attacker depends on x. This often makes the
analysis more complex and the comparison of various distance-bounding protocols difficult. Noise resilience
has consequently not been considered in the analyses of the protocols provided in Sections 3 to 14.
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